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I. INTRODUCTION
In the southeast comer of my yard, there is a new gardening shed. It is ex-
actly five feet from my neighbor's yard on the side, less than 120 square feet,
and under fourteen feet tall. And my subdivision's covenants allow gardening
sheds. Although I did not build the shed myself, having learned that lesson pre-
viously, I am intimately familiar with its size and location because my local or-
dinances require that familiarity (and because my neighbor thought our cove-
nants prohibit sheds). I measured our yard, drew a plan, reviewed our subdivi-
sion covenants, submitted the plan to the city, and after several weeks, received a
permit. I knew what the law was, and I followed it.
But I never asked why. I never wondered why five feet is the magical dis-
tance from a neighbor's yard, nor why 120 square feet requires a building per-
mit. And more important, I never questioned the purpose of these rules. Is there
some vision of my community that these ordinances are designed to achieve? If
so, what is it? I can understand the purpose of each requirement in isolation, but
do they work toward any broader end?
It may seem strange to begin an article in a symposium about developing
sustainable energy systems with a story about a backyard shed, but the shed is
relevant to the bigger story for two reasons. The key to a sustainable energy fu-
ture lies in achieving a sustainable demand for energy, more than any other fac-
tor. A large component of our energy demand is a function of our built environ-
ment, which is the product of thousands of individually insignificant land-use
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law.
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decisions in any place over time. The land-use ordinances that regulate shed con-
struction are part of that, reflecting an attitude that apparently prefers dispersed
development of geographically-separated uses that is highly resource intensive.
The shed requirements serve that perhaps unintended end by helping to ensure
that commercial or industrial uses are not surreptitiously performed in our back-
yards.
But this article is interested in another relationship between the backyard
shed and sustainable energy systems. In both cases, the thousands of small
choices that make up the trajectory of the larger system are often legally uncon-
nected. More important, the thousands of small choices are unconnected to any
holistic vision of a sustainable community. There are both horizontal and vertical
disconnects, and no mechanisms exist to ensure that local, or issue-specific, or
resource-specific decisions work together to promote the larger end--creating a
sustainable system. This is the "why?" question that I failed to ask about my
shed. What is the broader purpose of the regulation, and how does this specific
example get us there? In short, why does this law exist?
At its most broad and abstract, law exists-and can only exist-to promote
the public health, safety, and welfare. This authority, known as the police power,
is the inherent power of government.1 But more important, it is the exclusive
justification for government-it is both what government can do and why gov-
ernment can do it. As communities, we engage in an ongoing process of creating
an imagined future for a place. We then identify and implement the legal struc-
tures that will achieve those created imaginings.2 As the creators of government,
we require more than conclusory justifications that a government act promotes
those vague police power concepts. To the contrary, we expect law to promote a
specific understanding of what the public health, safety, and welfare look like,
on the ground, in our communities. If a governmental act does not promote our
visions of the public health, safety, and welfare-our visions of our communi-
ty-we legitimately question the validity of the act.'
What is the justification for the rules describing what my shed should look
like? What are the justifications for front-yard setbacks or minimum lot sizes? I
suggested that these ordinances contribute to sprawling development patterns.
But is that their purpose? I do not know the ultimate answer to that question be-
cause the purpose of many of these land-use ordinances is no longer apparent in
1. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 36 n.6 (1964);
see also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26,32 (1954) ("We deal, in other words, with what traditionally has
been known as the police power. An attempt to define its reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless, for
each case must turn on its own facts. The definition is essentially the product of legislative determina-
tions addressed to the purposes of government, purposes neither abstractly nor historically capable of
complete definitioa").
2. See generally JOHN R COMMONs, THE LEGAL FOuNDATIONs OF CAPrrAusM 147
(1923); see also DANIEL BROMLEY, SUFFICIENT REASON: VOLITIONAL PRAGMATISM AND THE
MEANNGOF EcONOMIc INSTrrtHONS 67-84 (2006).
3. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT §131, at 371 (2d ed.
1970) (1690) ("[T]he power of the Society, or Legislative constituted by them, can never be suppos'd to
extend farther than the common good.... And all this to be directed to no other end, but the Peace,
Safety, and publick good of the People.") (emphasis omitted).
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their application. And no legal requirements exist that would make apparent a
connection between purpose and on-the-ground effect.
The disconnect between resource- or place-specific laws or ordinances and
the broader community visions that justify them is apparent in the articles that
comprise this issue. Each of the articles demonstrates a connection to the prob-
lems inherent in moving toward a sustainable energy system. But none of the
articles, nor the structure of the symposium itself, reveals a durable legal connec-
tion between the purposes of various components. That is not the fault of the
authors, nor the symposium organizers, because no such connection exists. In
fact, several of the articles explicitly acknowledge this disconnect in purpose.
How do imperiled species protection regimes interact with energy transport? Is a
national energy production and supply infrastructure compatible with the vision
Nevada (or any other state) creates for its future?
The questions presented-and disconnects identified-in this symposium
are crucial because achieving a sustainable tomorrow is much broader than any
specific resource or problem. A sustainable system-whether an energy produc-
tion and transport system or a community-must recognize and synthesize those
conflicting purposes into a single, coherent, sustainable purpose (or constellation
of purposes) that we can achieve.
Although the route toward sustainability faces some obstacles and seems
overwhelming, it is not impassable. Like many difficult legal and policy ques-
tions, the obstacles are conceptual and practical. It is both difficult to imagine a
sustainable community and difficult to implement those imaginings in concrete
legal regimes. But sustainability faces a third obstacle more formidable than the
other two. Even if those conceptual and practical difficulties could be overcome,
would we choose to do so? The final obstacle is one of choice, and this is simul-
taneously the simplest and most difficult to overcome. It is the simplest because
we only have to choose to do it. But unfortunately, our existing institutional
structure prevents us from making-or better said, implementing-that choice.
The article will address each of these three obstacles with the purpose of
identifying a realistic and achievable approach to overcome them. Combined,
these obstacles create a lack of any coherent, and legally enforceable, vision for
a sustainable community-or a sustainable energy system, in the specific context
of this symposium-that would allow us to create sustainable places. Although
specific legal regimes that might promote a single component of a broader sus-
tainable system do exist, those resource-specific regimes are insufficient. For
however defined or envisioned, "sustainability" exists at a scale and level of ab-
straction that remains unapproachable by traditional institutional regimes; in
order to achieve sustainable communities, we must create, and choose, a me-
chanism to give legal effect to that abstraction.
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II. UNDERSTANDING "SUSTAINABILITY"
The first obstacle on our path to achieving sustainable communities lies in
the abstract concept "sustainability." 4 We use the word in many different con-
texts. A search for the words "sustainable" or "sustainability" in the United
States Code yields 317 different sections.5 Those statutory provisions address the
"sustainability... of local emergency communications[,]",6 "sustainable agricul-
ture,"7 sustainable use of naval petroleum reserves,8 "sustainable homeowner-
ship,"9 sustainable forestry,' ° and "sustainable economic growth and develop-
ment of sub-Saharan Africa,"" among many other diverse topics. In this article,
we must consider all of those understandings of sustainability together. Conse-
quently, I use "sustainability" in two ways: first, to refer to the interaction of all
of those different notions of sustainability in one community. And second, to
describe a sustainable system that consists of the interaction of all of the different
sustainable communities. Because this use of sustainability-and the sustainable
communities we must create-represents a paradigm shift from existing institu-
tional regimes, understanding sustainable communities requires the adoption of
vision-based, rather than issue-based or jurisdiction-based, approaches.
A common definition of sustainability originated in the United Nations
World Commission on Environment and Development (the "Brundtland Com-
mission"). The Brundtland Commission's report-"Our Common Future"-
defined sustainable development as "development that meets the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs."' 2 This definition and the concepts it represents have since been inter-
preted to include three components: environment, economy, and equity. " Al-
though probably the most widely used,'4 the Brundtland Commission's defini-
4. I prefer the word "sustainability" over "sustainable development" and will only use "sus-
tainable development" when citing to another source that uses that term or to refer to a component of the
broader sustainability concept. It is possible that growth can occur sustainably, but "development" is not
necessary to achieve a sustainable system.
5. I performed this search using the "USC" (United States Code unannotated) database on
Westlaw. "Sustainable Development" occurs 35 times.
6. 6 U.S.C. § 575 (2006).
7. 7 U.S.C. § 450i (2006). Many other provisions in Title 7 refer to sustainable agriculture
or related concepts.
8. 10 U.S.C. § 7420 (2006).
9. 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-23 (2006).
10. 16 U.S.C. § 1674a (2006).
11. 19 U.S.C. § 3701 (2006).
12. U.N. World Comm'n on Env't & Dev., Report: Our Common Future, 54, U.N. Doc.
A/42/427 (Aug 4, 1987), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
N87/184/67/IMG/N8718467.pdfOpenElement.
13. See, e.g., PRESIDENr'S CouNciL ON SUsTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, SUsTAINABLE
AMERICA A NEW CoNsENsus FOR PROSPERITY, OPPORTUNITY, AND A HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT FOR
THE FuruRE at We Believe Statement, point 10 (1996), available at
http://clinton2.nara.gov/PCSD/Publications/TFReports/amer-believe.html (This document explicitly
adopted the Brundtland Commission's definition of sustainable development).
14. A Westlaw search in the JLR (joumals and law reviews) database using this entire phrase
yielded 314 articles on Feb, 25, 2010. Using the search term "Brunland Commission"-the colloquial
name for the commission that created the preceding definition-yields 51 documents (many of which
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tion is not the only approach to sustainability. They might emphasize different
components, but most alternative definitions at least implicitly recognize the
need to consider human needs (economy and equity) and ecological needs over
time.'5
The Brundtland Commission's definition appears sufficiently difficult to
achieve on its own, but applying it on the ground reveals that it might be, in fact,
too simplistic. Our understandings of these needs vary across communities, geo-
graphic scales, and through time. Professor J. B. Ruhl described a five-
dimensional sustainability algorithm for making decisions that requires consid-
eration of economy, equity, and environment across multiple geographic scales
over time. He articulated the algorithm's function as follows:
[A] crude algorithm for sustainable development would (1) fimd the op-
timum for all three E's at one location and time, taking into account the
effects tinkering with any one will have on the other two; then (2) eva-
luate the effects of the local solution on all other local, regional, and
global solutions; then (3) evaluate the effects of the local solution on all
future solutions; and finally (4) repeat the process until the system
reaches a stable, sustainable equilibrium. 6
After recognizing that this algorithm must achieve the goals of environment,
ecology, and equity across time and space, while taking into account the "feed-
back and feedforward loops that exist in their coevolving system," Professor
Ruhl noted, "[tihis is a hard combinatorial problem if ever there was one."' 7
Although it is admittedly "crude," this algorithm contains an unrecognized,
but fundamental, failing that prevents it from making a real contribution to a
useful discussion about attaining sustainability. An algorithm is a useful tool
because it begins with what we know and provides clear steps from that known
place to some other place we desire to be. While clarity and a logical sequence
are necessary components of any algorithm, an algorithm's most important com-
ponent-its foundation-is the user. It must start with what the user already
knows. Without that, the algorithm is useless.
In Ruhl's algorithm, we cannot get past the first step. This algorithm pro-
vides that we first optimize environment, economy, and equity at one location
and time. But it does not provide a mechanism to achieve that end. And it is this
optimization, and specifically the implementation of the optimization, that will
remain the most difficult obstacle on the path to sustainability. But there is a
overlap with the first search). A similar search on Google Scholar, using the entire definitional phrase
reproduced here, yielded 6,250 results (on Feb. 25,2010).
15. See, e.g., THE SUSTAINABLE URBAN DEVELOPMENT READER 460-61 (Stephen M
Wheeler & Timothy Beatley eds., 2d ed 2009) (2006) (providing a number of different definitions of
sustainability from various perspectives).
16. J.B. Ruhl, Sustainable Development: A Five-Dimensional Algorithm for Environmental
Law, 18 STAN. ENVrL. L.J. 31, 57 (1999) [hereinafter Ruhl, A Five-Dimensional Algorithm]; see also J.
B. Ruh], Lav for Sustainable Development: Work Continues on the Rubik's Cube, 44 TULSA L. REV. 1
(2008).
17. Ruh, A Five-DimensionalAlgorithm, supra note 16, at 57.
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mechanism that allows that optimization and its implementation. That mechan-
ism requires that we understand that one entity is uniquely qualified to optimize
a community: the community itself. My purpose in writing this article is not to
recommend a dramatic new approach designed to achieve sustainability, nor to
rewrite Ruhl's algorithm. Once we identify where to begin- once we recognize
that only the community can envision its optimized condition-the algorithm
provides a useful approach, and we will envision the path to sustainability.
In getting to that beginning, one continuing problem we must overcome is
the assumption that there exists a sustainability that is independent of social
choice. 8 A sustainable community is a socio-ecological place in which our
choices interact with the functioning of natural systems. Although we cannot
perfectly control those natural systems-whether markets or ecosystems-we
necessarily influence their functioning. We write the rules that govern markets,' 9
and we are also ourselves ecological actors that affect the operations of ecosys-
tems.2" We make choices about where to live or not to live; what animals to eat,
protect, or eradicate; desired foods and building materials. All of these choices
necessarily affect related markets and ecosystems. Our choice to protect the gray
wolf, rather than exterminate it, is not an "immutable characteristic and rule" of
the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem or the tourism market associated with it.2 It
is just a choice that reflects our vision of the world we want to live in. That
choice affects markets and ecosystems, and we assess the consequences of our
choice and determine which of those consequences are the market and ecosystem
conditions we desire.2"
With this understanding, we see that there exists no inherent optimal condi-
tion for the environment, economy, and social equity. There is no a priori "sus-
tainable community" that we must only identify, understand, and allow to be.
There is only the condition or set of conditions that we, as a community, decide
18. See, e.g., Bruce Pardy, The Hand is Invisible, Nature Knows Best, and Justice is Blind:
Markets, Ecosystems, Legal Instrumentalism, and the Natural Law of Systems, 44 TULSA L. REV. 67, 76
(2008) ("These systems operate according to their own immutable characteristics and rules. They are
organic and evolutionary, changing through time, rather than existing in a fixed or static state. They arise
spontaneously and are neither created nor destroyed by the actions of individual people or agencies.").
19. A fair amount of confusion persists on this point A market is nothing more than a human
construct that ultimately relies on the rules of the system in which it exists. Consider, as a single exam-
ple, rights in property. Without an institutional regime that defines (and thus protects) property "rights,"
there can be no exchange of those rights. The market therefore requires a pre-existing institutional re-
gime, which is obviously a human construct. See, e.g., JOHN R COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CAPrrAusM (1924).
20. See, e.g., WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES iN THE LAND: INDIANS, COLONISTS, AND THE
ECOLOGY OF NEW ENGLAND (1983); WELLIAM CRONON, NATURE'S METROPOLIS: CHICAGO AND THE
GREAT WEST (1991); RiCHARD WHrrE, THE ORGANIC MACHINE: THE REMAKING OF THE COLUMBIA
RIVER (1995).
21. A recent study suggests that wolf reintroduction into Yellowstone has increased visitor
spending in the local economy by approximately $35 million per year. Livestock depredation by wolves
has caused a peak estimated economic loss of approximately $69,000 per year. John W. Duffield et al.,
Wolf Recovery in Yellowstone: Park Visitor Attitudes, Expenditures, and Economic Impacts, 25 THE
GEORGE WRIGHT FORUM 13, 18 (2008).
22. See, e.g., BROMLEY, supra note 2, at 67-84.
[VOL. 46
2010] REALIZING THE ABSTRACTION: USING TODAY'S LAW TO REACH 347
TOMORROW'S SUSTAINABIL1TY
that we prefer. The algorithm must therefore begin with those preferences, with
the community's vision of how it will look and operate in the future.
At this point it would be useful to explain my meaning when I use the word
"community" and the effect of that meaning on our discussion of sustainability.
The word often sounds like it represents a single, identifiable construct-usually
a geographic location, or more accurately, a set of experiences related to a spe-
cific geographic location. But "community" should not be limited to geography.
Community represents the particular settings, relationships, and choice sets that
concern a resource or set of resources. It is not the geography that makes com-
munity but rather the relationships, shared experiences, and shared visions asso-
ciated with that geography. Thus, in a particular geographic location, there might
be a small business community, a cycling community, a parents-of-toddlers
community, and-most important-a community of place. The community of
place is the meta-community-the community of relationships between and
among communities-that we have in mind when we identify a place.23 I will
employ this last use most often. It is this community of place that creates the
constellation of visions, hopes, and understandings of purpose that give rise to a
particular notion of sustainable place.
Understanding this definition of community, and understanding the role of
the community in describing sustainable place and creating the institutional re-
gime necessary to achieve that place, demonstrates that sustainability is not a
simple toolkit or set of discrete goals that can be simply articulated and indivi-
dually addressed and achieved. To be sure, a sustainability plan may include
those components. But sustainability is a vision-based concept, not a strictly
issue- or resource-based concept. Sustainability necessarily requires that we im-
agine both a set of conditions that the present community is capable of achieving
as well as a similar set of conditions that we desire to provide fUture generations.
Sustainability, of course, does include optimizing environment, economy, and
equity across geographic scales and across time, but that optimization is neces-
sarily determined by the community's visions of itself-what it is and what it
wants to be. Only sustainable visions can create sustainable places.
23. By using the word "place" in this fashion, I open a door to a wide literature from multiple
academic disciplines regarding the interaction of individuals and their environments. My "place" reflects
that literature to some degree, but does not approach the nuance present there. I simply use "place" to
describe the entire suite of resources and experiences in a specific geography around which community
might form. See, e.g., Edward Relph, Sense of Place, in 10 GEOGRAPHIC IDEAS THAT CHANGED THE
WORLD 205-26 (Susan Hansen ed, 1997); David A. Gruenewald, Foundations of Place: A Multidiscip-
linary Framework for Place-Conscious Education, 40 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 619 (2003); Robert Hay, Sense
of Place in a Developmental Context, 18 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 5 (1997); David M. Hummon, Community
Attachment: Local Sentiment and Sense of Place, in 12 HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND ENVIRONMENr:
ADVANCES IN THEORY AND REsEARCH 253 (Irwin Altman & Joachim F. Wohlwill eds., 1992).
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1II. PURPOSE ON THE GROUND, SCALE, AND THE DISCONNECT
BETWEEN WHERE WE WANT TO GO AND THE TOOLS WE USE TO
GET THERE
A. The Disconnect Between Law and Sustainability
The sustainability discussion in the preceding section might appear unne-
cessarily abstract and incomplete, but that is the essence of our current under-
standing of sustainability. Sustainability necessarily requires different approach-
es in different places, and different communities will imagine different condi-
tions or settings that might be equally durable over time. Sustainability is about
visions, but the law as applied is not. The law is about how we can resolve spe-
cific disputes in specific circumstances. Because sustainability is about creating
places and communities, and thus primarily about purpose and implementing
visions, specific-resource-focused legal regimes are too narrow--or more appro-
priately, operate on the wrong scale-to effectuate any comprehensive vision of
a sustainable community.
This distinction might initially appear inconsistent with my introductory
comments about the purpose of law. At its most fundamental, law is the tool we
use to create the set of conditions we select as our preferred future for our place.
It is the final blessing we bestow upon our settled deliberations. Law is perhaps
the most durable component in a socially constructed framework-a set of insti-
tutions-that shape and influence our community relationships and fields of ac-
tion. 4 These institutional agreements are therefore collective action, often articu-
lated as law or formal rules, that both constrain as well as liberate and expand
our individual and community opportunities.25
Because these institutional structures define choice sets, order and structure
behavior, and outline the universe of acceptable social actions, they can only
persist so long as they continue to advance the community goals that explain the
particular institutional choices. If in retrospect we determine that our past choic-
es do not advance our goals, or if our goals change, we make new choices. At
any given moment, the existing institutions represent a constellation of visions or
ideas regarding the purpose of a given place or situation, as those visions have
changed or developed up to that moment.2" The institutions represent the com-
munity's previous agreements about the future of that place, as those agreements
24. See, e.g, BROMLEY, supfra note 2, at 31-66. Bromley argues that institutions consist of
social norms, working rules, and property relations, with property relations being the most durable com-
ponent of the institutional structure. "Working rules" refers to operational law-the statutes and com-
mon law doctrines that generally influence, guide, or expand our day-to-day behavior. Bromley uses
"property relations" to refer to the settings and circumstances that the Supreme Court has chosen to
protect as property "rights." In this article, I use the word "law" to refer to both the working rules (e.g,,
statutes) and Constitutional provisions (i.e., property relations) that influence the development and main-
tenance of place.
25. See, e.g., John. R. Commons, Institutional Economics, 21 AM. ECON. REv. 648 (1931).
Bromley uses this same characterization to describe "public policy." Daniel W. Bromley, Reconsidering
Environmental Policy: Prescription Conequentialism and Volitional Pragmatism, 28 ENVIL. &
RESOURCE ECON. 73, 79 (2004).
26. See generally COMMONs, sipra note 2, at 147.
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have been institutionalized-either formally or informally-and guide behavior
at that moment. The community discussion about its future continues, and exist-
ing institutions might not appear capable of creating a new future now imagined
by the community. As new agreements emerge for the future of a place, or as it
becomes apparent that existing institutions cannot resolve conflict-either new
conflict or pre-existing conflict that the existing institutions originally "sought"
to remedy-the community will develop a new set of institutions, intending to
implement the new imagined future. 27
This discussion of institutional structures and their purpose might be con-
vincing in the abstract, but often there is a difference between our original justi-
fications for law and its ultimate condition on the ground in a specific place. One
of this country's founding, and most durable, myths concerns the "rule of law."
In this myth,28 the law exists independent of human preferences, and judges and
juries are bound by its principles and guidelines, whatever alternatives they
might choose otherwise. The myth is revealed in many comfortable and well-
worn phrases describing, or justifying, the American system. 29 The "law is no
respecter of persons."3 ° "All men are equal before the law."''. "This is a govern-
ment of laws not of men., 32 And of course, "We hold these truths to be self-
evident, that all men are created equal . . . ."3 There is both value and truth in
this myth, and many of this country's proudest moments have been when we
have achieved the ideals the myth embodies: protecting and respecting the indi-
vidual, irrespective of race, national origin, gender, economic condition, or polit-
ical power.34 Some of our most shameful moments have been digressions from
the myth.3 5
But as we move away from the natural rights of individuals, we find that
the law is nothing more than the formalization of our particular preferences at a
particular point in time. We create laws to achieve or maintain particular eco-
nomic conditions,3" to manage and allocate risk,37 to create a specific aesthetic,3"
27. BROMLEY, supra note 2, at 67-84. This process operates continually, and the creation of
an imagined future, development of institutional regimes to implement those imaginings, and the evalua-
tion of those institutional regimes given the previous imaginings, occur simultaneously. We simulta-
neously imagine, implement, evaluate, and imagine again. See G.L.S. SHAcKLE, DECISIoN, ORDER, AND
TIME iN HuMAN AFFAms (1961).
28. I do not use the word "myth" in any pejorative sense. Myths are the stories we use to ex-
plain specific behaviors or choices, and thus are as valuable or serious as we choose to make them. We
only use myth as a derogatory term when we are trying to discredit a story we do not find particularly
useful.
29. See, e.g., Walter Carrington, Equality Before the Larv, 8 VA. L. REG. 481 (1922).
30. Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. 441,453 (1874).
31. Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541,576 (1962).
32. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,177 (1951).
33. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
34. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
35. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393
(1857); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
36. For example, the Internal Revenue Code provisions allowing the deduction of mortgage
interest represent a specific economic choice that "prefers" home ownership over renting. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 163(hX2)(D), (3) (2006).
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or to protect, preserve, or restore particular natural resources that otherwise pos-
sess no inherent rights.39 On this last point, in suggesting that the objects of these
particular regulatory regimes "possess no inherent rights," I do not intend to
stake out a position on that topic. 4 Rather, my position is that we protect these
landscapes, plants, animals, and ecological systems because we choose to do so,
not because they are granted rights under our "rule of law."
Notwithstanding the role of choice in creating these regulatory regimes,
once created, they too fall into the same rule-of-law mindset that works so admi-
rably in the appropriate context. But our preference for the rule of law, and its
refusal to appreciate choice or context, moves those regimes away from their
original purpose to a condition in which only the language-i.e., the "law"-
matters. This approach can yield results inconsistent with the law's original pur-
pose. In motivating and approving the Clean Water Act, did the American
people41 anticipate that it would be implemented by referring to, and misquoting
(or selectively quoting), a specific 1954 dictionary, particularly where that ap-
proach leads to reduced protection of the nation's waters?4 In choosing to pro-
37. The pollution control statutes all contain some mechanism for determining how risk is al-
located between polluting industries and the public. The strictest standard in the Clean Air Act is the
"lowest achievable emission rate." With the requirement that it be "achievable" by industry, even this
standard recognizes that the public must bear some risk of polluting activities. See 42 U.S.C. § 7501(3)
(2006).
38. Many local land-use ordinances serve to achieve a specific aesthetic. Minimum lot sizes,
or large front-yard setbacks, reflect an understanding of what residential areas "should" look like. Simi-
larly, historic preservation laws protect a specific aesthetic. The U.S. Supreme Court recognized- "The
concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it represents are spiritual as well as
physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the
community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as
carefully patrolled." Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
39. See, e.g., The Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-99 (2006); The Wilderness
Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-36 (2006); The National Park Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-4 (2006).
40. For a detailed discussion of this topic, see DONALD VANDEVEER & CHRISTINE PIERCE,
THE ENVIRONMENTAL ETHics & PoLiCY BOOK: PILOSOPHY, ECOLOGY, AND ECONOMICS (3d ed
2003); RODERICK FRAZIER NAS, THE RIGHTS OF NATURE: A HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
(1989); PAUL W. TAYLOR, RESPECr FOR NATURE: A THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS (1986).
41. While it seems impossible to those of us whose political experience is mostly limited to
post 1994 hyper-partisanship, the Clean Water Act (CWA) passed overwhelmingly. Congress approved
the basic structure of the Act in 1972 by almost immediately overriding a presidential veto. See 86 Stat.
816, 903-04 (1972). The CWA's most significant amendments also passed by significant margins: 96 to
0 in the Senate and 346 to 2 in the House (1977 amendments), and 376 to 37 in the House (1990
amendments). The Library of Congress, THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/zd095:HR03199:@@@
L&sunm2=-m&#summary (last visited Feb. 26, 2010); The Library of Congress, THOMAS,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/zdl01 :HR04323:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Feb. 26,
2010). The CWA is not unique in this regard The Endangered Species Act of 1973 passed the Senate
92-0 and the House 355-4. The Library of Congress, THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d093:SN01983:@@@L&summ2-m& (last visited Feb. 26, 2010).
42. In his plurality opinion in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006), Justice Scalia
interpreted the Clean Water Act's jurisdictional limitations by referring to the definition of "waters" in
the WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2882 (2d ed. 1954). Although he made a point to
note that the CWA refers to the plural "waters," the dictionary definition Justice Scalia used was for the
singular "water." Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 732. Justice Scalia skipped multiple options that would have
supported an alternative conclusion before arriving at the definition that he edited to serve his purpose (I
am fortunate to have the same dictionary in the hallway about five feet outside my office door). See id
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tect endangered species "whatever the cost," 3 did Congress intend its purpose in
enacting the Endangered Species Act (ESA) would be ignored in order to allow
standing for claimants seeking to reduce the protections offered imperiled spe-
cies?' Whether these decisions were correct as a matter of law is not the point.
Both decisions overlooked the purpose of the statutes to focus on the meaning of
specific words considered in isolation. The purpose was not important. Only the
myth was important.
A strict formalistic approach to resolving disputes will lead to some injus-
tices. And we might accept those (hopefully) rare injustices in exchange for the
benefits provided by the rule of law. This could be a legitimate pragmatic choice,
and, in many cases, we make just that choice for pragmatic reasons-i.e., we
prefer the consequences of that approach, in that specific circumstance, to the
consequences we imagine would result from feasible alternatives. But one of the
negative consequences of focusing on language, instead of purpose, is that we
forget our purpose. Over time, the purpose no longer matters. The rule of law
then operates in isolation.
The examples used in this discussion are relatively narrow. We can under-
stand clean water and protecting imperiled species without much struggle, and
we can assess the success and usefulness of the statutory regimes relatively easi-
ly. If the water is clean, and we still want clean water, the statute has been a suc-
cess. If imperiled species recover, and other species no longer go extinct (or go
extinct less frequently perhaps), and we still desire to protect those species, the
ESA remains useful. But what about a broader purpose? Is there a broader pur-
pose?
In the two examples I provided above, I suggested that the Supreme Court
followed a formalistic approach to statutory interpretation that placed little em-
phasis on the original purposes of the statutes in question. That disconnect be-
tween purpose and interpretation demonstrates one liability of our institutions
that makes it difficult to achieve sustainable communities. But the cases demon-
strate another liability as well. In the Clean Water Act example-Rapanos v.
United States-the Court considered the limited question of the meaning of "wa-
ters of the United States" in the context of that specific Act.45 This is a simple
jurisdictional question-did Congress provide the EPA jurisdiction over Mr.
Rapanos's activities?"6 In Bennett v. Spear, the Court focused entirely on the
at 732-39. Is that the "rule of law"? For a discussion of how the plurality's opinion is disconnected from
scientific justifications, see Barbara Cosens, Resolving Conflicts in Non-Ideal, Complex Systems: Solu-
tions for the Law-Science Breakdown in Environmental and Natural Resources Law, 48 NAT.
REsouRCES J. 257 (2008).
43. TennesseeValleyAuthorityv. Hill, 437 U.S. 153,184(1978).
44. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997). This decision was unanimous, and the reasoning
convincing, given the framework the Court provided in which to conduct its reasoning Bic that reason-
ing is only legitimate if we accept the Court's assumption--supported by precedent-that in interpreting
the specific provisions at issue, the overall purpose of the statute is largely irrelevant
45. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 723-39.
46. The Court specifically avoided the question of whether the Congress could reach the ac-
tivity under its Commerce Clause authority. Id. at 737-38. It determined that Congress had not granted
the EPA its full Commerce Clause authority, so the question was statutory, rather than constitutional. Id
IDAHO LA WREVIEW
meaning of "best scientific and commercial data available" to determine if that
phrase could be interpreted to protect economic interests. 47 Both disputes dem-
onstrate an immutable characteristic of our legal system-an exceedingly narrow
focus on specific behavior or specific aspects of social, economic, or physical
relationships.
We find examples of this narrow focus throughout the law. Consider, for
example, the void-for-vagueness doctrine in criminal law, which Black's defines
as "[t]he doctrine-based on the Due Process Clause-requiring that a criminal
statute state explicitly and definitely what acts are prohibited, so as to provide
fair warning and preclude arbitrary enforcement."4 Similarly, real property
deeds might also be void where they have "such an insufficient property descrip-
tion as to be unenforceable., 49 In the strictest cases, governmental actions must
be "narrowly tailored" to achieve a "compelling state interest."50 Even in the
most permissive approach concerning the Constitution's Equal Protection re-
quirements, law must be rationally related to a legitimate state interest." And,
even without the equal protection guarantees, law must still articulate an identi-
fiable end: "a regulation that fails to serve any legitimate governmental objective
may be so arbitrary or irrational that it runs afoul of the Due Process Clause."52
These are not criticisms. Vague rules that are open to interpretation in-
crease conflict and risk arbitrary government action. But narrow rules cannot
achieve big things unless they are specifically and enforceably tied to those big
things, which courts are reluctant to do. These characteristics of our legal system
as applied-the inherent narrow focus of legal rules and the unwillingness of
courts to allow purpose to influence interpretation-might preclude the useful-
ness of existing institutional regimes in a quest for sustainability. We can sum-
marize the problem by identifying four potential disconnects between our current
understandings of the role of law and the necessary understanding of sustainabil-
ity.
The following are not perfect disconnects, and some overlap will exist be-
tween and among the concepts, but they serve to demonstrate the differential
operations of law and sustainability. In assessing the usefulness of these discon-
nects, consider the trilogy of substantive first year courses in law school-
Property, Torts, and Contracts-and the constitutional provisions that inform
each. To what extent do these courses consider the first component of each dis-
connect? Or are they primarily about the second component? First, sustainability
is about creating and protecting communities and community rights; the law
focuses on individuals and individual rights. Second, sustainability creates bene-
fits; the law focuses on preventing or remedying harm. Third, sustainability is
47. 520 U.S. at 176-77.
48. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1585 (8th ed. 2004).
49. Id. at 1604.
50. 16A ANC JUR. 2d Constitutional Law § 403 (2009); City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living
Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) ("[T]hese laws are subjected to strict scrutiny and will be sustained
only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest").
51. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) ("[W]e will uphold the legislative classifica-
tion so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end").
52. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005).
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aspirational; the law is operational. And finally, sustainability operates in a
world defimed by community choice sets; the law operates within arbitrary juris-
dictional boundaries. We might summarize these disconnects by analogizing to
the false dichotomy I alluded to earlier: sustainability is pragmatic; the law is
formalistic."
These four disconnects suggest we can best understand the problems inhe-
rent in understanding visions of sustainability as problems grounded in scale.
This is not a problem of simple geographic scale, although that might be one
component of it.54 Rather, there is a disconnect in the scale of our choice sets.
We have a range of options for defining our community, and a range of options
for addressing specific resources. Unfortunately, nothing connects the two. To
borrow from a common example of the problems of geographic scale, it is as if
we articulated a goal of protecting water quality in the Snake River, but failed to
use that goal to guide the use or misuse of the Salmon, Payette, or Wood Rivers,
or the Henry's Fork.55 Would we then wonder why the Snake is still dirty?
Sustainability operates on multiple geographic, social, and temporal scales.
A geographic or specific problem-based approach cannot address the range of
issues, and more important, the range of relationships, necessary to approach
sustainability. Attaining a sustainable community at any scale therefore requires
a reimagining of jurisdictional understandings to more closely match the com-
munity's choice sets. The institutional arena must be reconfigured as a "vision-
shed" that incorporates all elements of a specific community's imagined future.
The necessity of the vision-shed approach is best demonstrated by consi-
dering the failings of existing legal regimes.56
53. I suggest that this is a false dichotomy because the two approaches are not mutually ex-
clusive, at least when considered as adjudicative approaches. Pragmatic adjudication can be formalistic,
if formalism leads to useful outcomes. And formalism is a pragmatic choice to prefer a specific out-
come. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY 57-96 (2003); see also
Richard A Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, in THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM: NEW ESSAYS ON
SOCIAL THOUGh'T, LAW, AND CULTuRE 235, 235-53 (Morris Dickstein ed, 1998); Richard A- Posner,
Pragmatism Versus Purposivism in First Amendment Analysis, 54 STAN. L. REV. 737, 738 (2002)
("Pragmatism doesn't lead in a straight line to a philosophy of adjudication. But it encourages a mindset
that is skeptical of any such philosophy that casts the judge in the role of a quester after certainty who
employs to that end tools as close to formal logic as possible. It encourages the thought that the object of
adjudication should be to help society to cope with its problems, and so the rules that judges create as a
by-product of adjudication should be appraised by a 'what works' criterion rather than by the correspon-
dence of those rules to truth, natural law, or some other high-level abstract validating principle.").
54. There is a long tradition of literature addressing this question of appropriate geographic
scale for addressing a variety of resource questions, beginning famously (from a westem perspective)
with John Wesley Powell's Report on the Lands of the Arid Region of the United States. JOHN WESLEY
POWELL, DEP'T OF INTERIOR, REPORT ON THE LANDS OF THE ARID REGION OF THE UNITED STATES (2d
ed, 1879). See also Edward J. Taaffe, Spatial Organiation and Interdependence, in 10 GEOGRAPHIC
IDEAS THAT CHANGED THE WORLD, supra note 23, at 146; but see David Delany & Helga Leitner, The
Political Construction ofScale, 16 POL. GEOGRAPHY 93 (1997).
55. These are all Idaho rivers that feed the Snake.
56. If it is not obvious by this point, the remainder of this article should make dear that my
understanding of pragmatism is not Judge Posner's means-focused pragmatism, despite my approving
citations above. Rather than viewing it as merely a means to a pre-determined end, pragmatism helps us
create desirable ends. Pragmatism cares about purpose, because it is only by comparing consequences to
purpose that we can assess the value of a particular choice. And through understanding the conse-
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B. Visualizing the Disconnects
My annual argument to my students is that Land-use Law is the best class
they will take in law school. Although they generally respond with a depressing-
ly long list of other classes they prefer, we usually agree that land-use law is
more directly connected to their everyday experiences than any other area of
law. The size, cost, and location of the houses or apartments they live in, the
length, ease, and aesthetics of their commutes to school or work, the nature of
their recreational activities, among many other everyday experiences, are the
products of a constellation of land-use decisions over time. Although most of us
choose not to spend time envisioning the many complex legal relationships that
create the world we experience when we wake up each morning, we do intuitive-
ly understand the product of those relationships. Our land-use decisions create
the place, the community, and the suite of experiences that we call "home."
Narrowing that suite of experiences a bit to focus on the physical structure
that is the epicenter of those experiences demonstrates how legal regimes deter-
mine the nature of our physical experience. Most local governments substantially
regulate home building, and particularly the building (or planning) of multiple
houses on a single parcel of land-i.e., a subdivision. Zoning ordinances might
define the acceptable height and volume of the house, its location on its lot, the
number of families or individuals that live inside, and the distance to the other
elements of a person's life-work, school, leisure, the local doughnut shop.
Building codes constrain how the physical structure itself is constructed, includ-
ing specifications on the spacing of electrical outlets or the size of windows. And
where multiple residences will be constructed on what was formerly a single
parcel, subdivision ordinances determine or constrain lot sizes, public and pri-
vate access, availability of public utilities or similar private services, width, loca-
tion and layout of streets and alleys, landscaping, and even acceptable paint col-
ors.
57
But notwithstanding this substantial regulation of our "castles," most legal
regimes do very little to ensure consistency across these various approaches. In
Boise, Idaho, for example, the city's subdivision ordinance includes the require-
ment that all preliminary plats be shared with eighteen specified agencies, as
well as any other appropriate agencies, for review and recommendations." s Those
agencies have five working days to review the preliminary plat; if there is no
response within those five working days, "approval of the Preliminary Plat by
quences of a specific purpose, pragmatism allows an analysis of that original purpose. Consider Pierce's
original argument regarding the fixation of belief. He was not concerned with means to achieve pre-
existing beliefs. Rather, pragmatism was the tool to employ to arrive at the belief that would motivate us
to act A method is not a belief; it is a tool used to attain belief See Charles Sanders Pierce, The Fixation
of Belief 12 POPULAR Sci. MONTHLY 1 (1877).
57. See, e.g., BOULDER COUNTY, CoL., LAND USE CODE art. 4-116 (2009) (specifying the
paint colors allowed on building in the district), available at http://www.
bouldercounty.org/lu/lucode/pdf/Boulder-County-Land Use CodeArticle_4 116.pdf
58. BoisE, IDAHo, MuN. CODE §9-20-05.C.4 (2009), available at http://www.
cityofboise.orgfDepartments/CityClerk/PDF/CityCode/Title9/0920.pdf.
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such agency will be considered to be granted." 9 A similar requirement, and
similar limitation on the time allowed for review, exists at the final plat stage of
the process."
This might appear to be a legitimate and effective means to approach inter-
nal consistency across all the various agencies with potential jurisdiction over
the development of a specific parcel of land, but even a cursory review suggests
it does not necessarily achieve that end. Although state law requires limited ap-
proval by certain agencies before recordation of a final plat, the Boise ordin-
ance's requirements are limited to transmitting the preliminary and final plats to
the listed agencies for "review and recommendations." There are no additional
requirements addressing how to incorporate those recommendations, if at all. So
long as the city follows its other obligations with respect to land-use decisions-
including the requirement not to act in an arbitrary and capricious manner-it is
apparently free to ignore any offered recommendations. 6
A more careful consideration of this specific ordinance reveals a significant
problem that is not confined to Boise, and would not be remedied by a redrafting
of the ordinance to require justifying the failure to incorporate any legitimate
recommendation. We will imagine for the moment that any substantial commu-
nity development requires the input of a variety of public and private agencies.
More important, we will further imagine that the primary authorizing or permit-
ting agency must incorporate those recommendations, or justify its failure to do
so. As noted, our list of agencies that must review the development includes both
public and private entities. In addition to fire department, school district, high-
way district, the parks and recreation department, and surveyor, among other
public agencies, we will consider input from utility companies, cable franchises,
and even local interest groups.6"
But now that we have allowed these various agencies the ability to partici-
pate in the approval process, we must ask how they will review the proposal
(e.g., a subdivision plat). What is the purpose of the agency, and what ends does
it want the development approval to achieve? If the various agencies have dispa-
rate and conflicting purposes, their reviews and recommendations are likely to
be similarly conflicting, and even the requirement that the permitting agency
incorporate recommendations on the proposal could not ensure any consistency
across purposes. Consider a single type of public agency that should review and
59. Id.
60. Id. §9-20-05.D.4.
61. As noted above, state law does include several specific requirements regarding approval
by other agencies. For example, the local highway district, if any, must accept the dedication of any
public roads, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-1309(2) (West 2009); the applicable health district must approve
the sewer and water facilities, IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 50-1326 to 1329; the county treasurer must certify
that there remain no unpaid, but due, property taxes, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-1308. Not only are these
required approvals limited to a narrow set of agencies, they are limited to a narrow range of issues.
Other than the somewhat vague and generic police power purposes, these requirements do not interact to
achieve any set of community goals or preferences.
62. The Boise subdivision ordinance, for example, provides that Idaho Power, Qwest, Inter-
mountain Gas, and the applicable cable system fianchise have the opportunity to review the plat and
provide recommendations. BOISE, IDAHO, MUN. CODE §9-20-05.C.4.
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offer recommendations for any proposed subdivision in our system: the local
transportation department or highway district. In Boise, this department is the
Ada County Highway District ("ACHD"). While not every municipality will
have a transportation agency with the ACHD's specific structure, the ACHD's
purpose is illustrative.
The ACHD is an independent government agency responsible for the entire
automobile transportation system in Ada County, Idaho,6" including all urban
streets, rural roadways, and bridges in the County, excluding only state and fed-
eral highways.64 The ACHD's jurisdiction extends across both incorporated mu-
nicipalities and unincorporated areas.65 The ACHD describes its mission as: "To
provide the best public highway system for the safe and efficient movement of
people and goods in Ada County."' Like any public entity, the ACHD derives
its authority from the police power, and accordingly exists to promote the public
health, safety, and welfare.
But the District's stated mission suggests that it takes a very narrow view
of its public obligations. To understand the problem with this narrow view, let us
assume again that there exists in any community an agreement, which evolves
over time, about what the community should look like, what its values are, and
how it wants to grow or change in the future. It is this vision of the community
that justifies all of the community's regulatory actions; the vision is the purpose
for those actions. It is this vision that gives meaning to the abstract notions of
public health, public safety, and public welfare that comprise the police power
and legitimate government. Given that assumption, we expect all government
agencies to act to implement that vision, as possible, within their areas of author-
ity. If a given agency is not so motivated, we might fairly question the validity of
its actions.
The stated mission of the Ada County Highway District is not unique to
Ada County. A popular traffic engineering textbook contains the following
statement on its first page: "Traffic engineering may be defined as that phase of
engineering which deals with the safe and efficient movement of people and
goods on streets and highways."67 The similarities between this definition of
traffic engineering and the ACHD's mission are not coincidental and suggest
that ACHD had the concept "traffic engineering" firmly in mind when crafting
63. Located in southwest Idaho, Ada County is Idaho's most populous county. Ada County
QuickFacts from the U.S. Census Bureau, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/
states/16/16001.htnil (last visited Feb. 24, 2010). In addition to Boise, Ada County includes the cities of
Eagle, Garden City, Kuna, Meridian, and Star. About Ada County, http://www.adaweb.net/Aboutaspx
(last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
64. The district was created by referendumn on May 25, 1971. ADA COUNTY HIGHWAY
DismIcr, POLICY MANUAL §1001 [hereinafter ACHD MANUAL], available at
http://www.achd.ada.idus/AboutACHD/PolicyManual.aspx. The Idaho Legislature affirmed the district
in 1985. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 40-1301.
65. See ACHD MANUAL, supra, note 64, at §1001.
66. Ada County Highway District, About Us, http://www.achcadcaid.us/About
ACHD/Default.aspx (last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
67. WilIAM R- MCSHANE & ROGER P. RoEss, TRAFFIC ENGINEERING 1 (1990).
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its mission.68 Applying only a small amount of creative license, we can use this
definition of traffic engineering to rewrite the ACHD's mission as "to provide
the best public highway system for traffic engineering in Ada County."
Whether there is anything problematic about this revised (or the original)
statement of purpose depends on how we define "safe and effective movement."
That definition can vary from place to place, but exploring how traffic is engi-
neered suggests that "safe and effective movement" does not consider the full
constellation of concerns that create a community vision. In fact, traffic engi-
neering is specifically concerned with an extremely narrow subset of those con-
cerns.
Before continuing, I should recognize the unfairness of isolating a single
public agency for ridicule and explain that choice. Transportation departments
are not alone in failing to consider broader community visions, and thereby con-
tributing to unsustainable places. When I walk out the front door of my home in
Moscow, Idaho, it takes me about ten to twelve steps to reach the street. I could
do the same at my previous house in Madison, Wisconsin, and in my childhood
home in southeastern Idaho. Despite different settlement histories and cultural
traditions, each of these towns has selected almost identical front yard setbacks
for most residential development. Notwithstanding the tens of thousands of dif-
ferent jurisdictions, with different histories and visions of the future, across this
country, zoning districts for single family homes routinely follow the same pat-
tern of substantial front yard setbacks, regardless of local conditions.69 Perhaps
more frightening, both personally and in the context of creating unique and sus-
tainable communities, all three of my aforementioned houses share virtually
identical floor plans, despite sitting on lots with very different physical condi-
tions. In short, it is not just our reliance on the automobile that threatens our abil-
ity to create unique and sustainable communities. We refuse to create and im-
plement unique visions of community in many areas.
But the automobile plays perhaps a greater role than any other single factor
in shaping the physical structure of our lives and communities. For my four-
teenth birthday, my father rented a small plane and took my two brothers and me
for a ride around southeastern Idaho. Although we flew over the Teton Dam site,
near the Tetons, and over much of the national forest where we spent the sum-
mers camping, I remember very little about those parts of the flight. Instead,
because my brothers had spent the hours before the flight eating their allowances
in penny candy, I remember that my father's flying skills were a bit rusty.7" But
68. Entering the phrase "safe and efficient movement of people and goods" into the Google
search engine leads to an enormous variety of traffic-related government websites, including multiple
state departments of transportation, local governments, the Federal Highway Administration, and even
the government of South Africa. The search also returns a variety of trafic engineering manuals, guides
and other documents.
69. See DANRELR MANDELKER, LAND UsE LAw §5.01 (5th ed. 2003).
70. It was not something I considered surprising at the time, but my brothers had consumed
their allowances in penny candy (and then lost the penny candy to the plane's little bags) because they
were able to walk downtown to the store. When my father decided to rent the plane, we called home to
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more significant, I still recall vividly the "epiphany" I experienced flying over
my hometown when I realized how much of the physical space was covered by
asphalt. By far the most significant feature of the landscape was the road system,
which touched every aspect of my physical environment. While Google Earth
and readily available aerial photographs likely will prevent my sons from expe-
riencing a similar epiphany, since that awareness will be a more integral part of
their lives, the effect of cars on our physical environment has only increased in
the two-and-a-half decades since that flight.7 More than any other public deci-
sion, the creation of our transportation system determines our community land-
scape. Even my complaints about uniform zoning ordinances only make sense in
reference to a road.
Unfortunately, notwithstanding the outsized influence of the transportation
system on the landscape of our neighborhoods and communities, we pay very
little attention to the desires of the community-its vision for itself-in deter-
mining the operation of that system. We will discuss the planning of the system
in more detail below, but consider how we operate the system itself, specifically
the speed at which cars travel. Considering this single element of the traffic sys-
tem best demonstrates the potentially narrow focus of highway districts and their
current inability to help develop sustainable places.
Excessive speed is a primary cause of fatalities associated with motor ve-
hicle accidents,72 and it therefore stands to reason that reducing speed at which
vehicles travel would be an effective mechanism to improve the safety of the
transportation system. But more to the point of our present discussion, the speed
of vehicle traffic also has a dramatic effect on pedestrians, cyclists, and the
neighborhoods through which roads pass.73 As vehicular speed increases, the
attractiveness of the neighborhood as a place to be-to walk, ride a bike, or just
enjoy the view-decreases. But perhaps more striking than the sense that we do
not like a place is the feeling that we have been there before, even when visiting
a new place. Cars, and traffic engineers, follow the same rules in Boise, Idaho, as
see if my brothers wanted to join us. My mother drove downtown and found my brothers walking down
Main Street. This was a perfectly normal occurrence. They were nine and eleven years old at the time.
71. Between 1982 and 2003, developed land area in the United States increased approx-
imately 48.3%. NATURAL RES. CONsERVATION SERv., NATURAL RESOURCES INVENTORY: 2003 NRI,
LAND USE 5 (2007). Total population increased approximately 25% over the same period (between the
1980 and 2000 censuses, population increased 24.2%). U.S. CENsUS BUREAU, STATiSTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNrrED STATES 5 (2000), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/statab/sec01.pdf
72. See, e.g., CEJUN LHu & RAJESH SUBRAMANLAN, NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY
ADMIN., REPORT No. DOT HS 811 232, FACTORS RELATED TO FATAL SINGLE-VEIOCLE RUN-OFF-
ROAD CRASHEs 1-2 (2009), available at http://www-nrdtnhtsa.dot.gov/
Pubs/811232.PDF; DEBRA AScONE & TONJA LINDSEY. NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.,
RESEARCH NOTE No. DOT HS 811218, TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTs: FATAL CRASHES INVOLVING YOUNG
DRIVERS 4 (2009), available at http://www-nrd.nhtsadotgov/Pubs/
811218.PDF (discussing contributing factors to fatal crashes involving young drivers).
73. See, e.g., Kirsten Krahnstoever Davison & Catherine T. Lawson, Do Attributes in the
Physical Environment Influence Children's Physical Activity? A Review of the Literature., 3 INT'L J.
BEHAvIoRAL NUTRmON AND PHYSICAL AcrTvrrY (2006); Anna Timperio et al., Perceptions about the
Local Neighborhood and Walking and Cycling Among Children, 38 PREVENTATIVE MED. 39 (2004);
Muim Sheller & John Urry, The City and the Car, 24.4 INT'L J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 737 (2000);
JAMES HOWARD KUNSTLER. THE GEOGRAPHY OF NOWHERE: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF AMERICA'S
MAN-MADE LANDSCAPE (1994).
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they do in Madison, Wisconsin. Despite the different cultural and development
histories of the two places, the new roads, new subdivisions, new strip malls feel
strikingly similar. To borrow from James Howard Kunstler, our communities are
rapidly becoming geographies of nowhere, where a thousand automobile-
focused decisions lead to a thousand little no places that combine to create big
no places.74
Notwithstanding the potential for traffic speed to influence the livability of
a community, and for the physical, engineering responses required to facilitate
safe travel at speed to dramatically alter a neighborhood's landscape, traffic en-
gineers pay little attention to those factors in setting speed limits. In the Traffic
Engineering Handbook, the Institute of Transportation Engineers provides that
the "[e]stablishment of speed limits should be based on proper engineering and
traffic data."75 The Handbook then provides a list of the factors that should be
considered in establishing speed limitations. The four factor categories are: pre-
vailing vehicle speeds, physical features of the road itself (e.g., design speed,
road surface, slope, curves, etc.), accident experience, and traffic characteristics
and control.76 Only one sub-factor-listed last-concerns anything other than the
vehicle or physical roadway: vehicle-pedestrian conflicts.77 In short, we base our
speed limits almost exclusively on the physical characteristics of the road it-
self-from curb to curb-and the present behavior of traffic on the road. Within
these factors, the primary determinant of speed limits is how fast people current-
ly drive on the roadway, independent of how fast we think people should drive:
"The 85th percentile speed as determined by speed studies is a principle factor to
be used in the determination of proper speed limits. It is generally assumed that
85% of drivers operate at speeds that are reasonable and prudent for the condi-
tions present in each situation." '
Both the measurement of system performance and the setting of speed lim-
its fail to consider several critical elements of the communities the systems
serve. As noted above, the traffic engineer's goal (and the goal of the ACHD) is
to promote the "efficient" movement of people and goods. From the traffic engi-
neer's perspective, "efficient" movement apparently means the movement of as
many people or goods as quickly as possible without wasting system resources
(i.e., roads). Although "efficient" could also include movement without undue
risk to the human environment, the additional use of "safe" movement as a dif-
ferent concept suggests that "efficient" focuses primarily on a system that best
uses is physical resources to achieve the desired end-the rapid movement of
goods and people. The end result, perhaps not unexpected, is a system of wide
roads without obstacles that might impede rapid movement. The "obstacles" that
74. KUNSTLER, supra note 73.
75. H. Richard Mitchell & Roy A. Parker, Traffic Regulations, in INSTrrUIE OF
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have been eliminated include street trees, public works of art, and the narrow,
comfortable residential streets found in older residential districts. But even if
these elements of community were not considered obstacles, they are not things
the traffic engineering system allows the engineer to consider. This is not to say
that traffic engineers do not care about livable, memorable communities, but
rather that the traffic engineering system does not care. Achieving the goals of
that system preclude consideration of the other factors. In other words, when the
traffic engineer achieves her goal of "safe and effective" movement of goods and
people, the community may be prevented from achieving its goals of creating a
memorable place.79
Our transportation system, and the subdivision or land-use approach gener-
ally, demonstrates how our current legal regimes lack the understanding of vi-
sion-sheds, or even communities, that will be necessary to achieve sustainability.
But that failure of vision-or more accurate, that failure to connect aspiration to
operation-is unnecessary. We have simply chosen that disconnect. Very few
regimes make any effort to ensure these multiple regulatory approaches are con-
sistent with any broader vision for the future of a community. Although I noted
the pragmatism vs. formalism distinction, it is not that choice that perpetuates
the disconnects as they exist in Idaho (or many other states). Rather, it is a
choice within a formalist, rule-of-law system, complicated by an ignorance of
purpose, that promotes the disconnect. We can make a different choice.
IV. UNNECESSARY IMPEDIMENTS AND CHOICES WE DO NOT
UNDERSTAND
Given the disparate purposes of the various components of any system that
contribute to a community, the only mechanism to ensure that each of those
components works together to achieve a single end-e.g., the creation and main-
tenance of a sustainable community-is to create an institutional regime that
requires each component to achieve that end, whatever its sub-purpose. As
communities create shared visions of their future, they identify sets of values,
physical conditions, and notions of place within a broader community that justify
all other community actions. Too often, regulatory systems emerge and evolve
by focusing on the single question of how they might achieve a limited end (e.g.,
the provision of energy) rather than asking the more important question of why
we care about that end. We provide energy (or build roads, or allow subdivision
79. This is a somewhat limited criticism of our current transportation engineering system,
and further critiques must await another discussion. Our transportation system both institutionalizes and
reifies social biases that preserve a series of inequalities. "Reify" is rather inadequate, as the transporta-
tion system allows the actual physical construction of these biases. The inequalities become an integral
part of the durable, built environment The single-occupant private automobile is the realm of the rich,
white, and male. Transportation choices that prefer the automobile to walking, bicycling, or useable
public transportation perpetuate gender, race, and class biases and inequalities. See, e.g., Dolores Hay-
den, Domesticating Urban Space, in REDESIGNING THE AMERIcAN DREANC THE FUrIJRE OF HOusING,
WORK, AND FAmY LFE 225 (2002 [1984]); Dan Koeppel, Invisible Riders: For L.A. 's Immigrant Day
Laborers, Biking Isn't Exercise or a Hobby. It's a Way to Get to Work-If There's Work To Be Found,
UTNE, July/Aug 2006, at 50.
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development) only because that effort is required to build community. We also
accept that achieving our desired end might require certain community sacrific-
es. So if the primary purpose is to support our community, or to implement a
shared vision of the future of our community, why do we not care about the ef-
fect on that community as we develop the system? If we are not following a path
toward our collective vision of place, what is the point?
We are not without examples of how we might use broad community vi-
sions to direct resource- or place-specific decisions or regulatory regimes; but
unfortunately, we do not take advantage of even those limited opportunities.
Current institutional regimes contain a crucial, and completely unnecessary, im-
pediment to achieving sustainability: the unwillingness to give legal effect to
land-use plans. There is no reason for this. Whatever the original reason for this
choice, we retain the ability to select a different path. We can make this new
choice consistent with the myth that apparently motivated our past choice--the
rule of law.
Most American jurisdictions follow a similar approach to the regulation of
private lands and the development of local communities. This similarity origi-
nates in two model statutes crafted by the Department of Commerce in the
1920s. Like most states, Idaho has adopted language very similar to that origi-
nally provided in 1926 in the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA).80 The
SZEA's language provides that land-use regulations "shall be made in accor-
dance with a comprehensive plan."'" Idaho law provides that "zoning districts
shall be in accordance with the policies set forth in the adopted comprehensive
plan.
82
Although this language might appear relatively straightforward, confusion
about the appropriate use of a "plan" for guiding zoning decisions arose almost
immediately. 3 Section 3 of the SZEA, completed in 1926 and adopted almost
immediately by over half of the states," contains the following requirement in its
entirety:
Such regulations 5 shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive
plan and designed to lessen congestion in the streets; to secure safety
from fire, panic, and other dangers; to promote health and the general
welfare; to provide adequate light and air; to prevent the overcrowding
of land; to avoid undue concentration of population; to facilitate the
adequate provision of transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks,
and other public requirements. Such regulations shall be made with rea-
80. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 67-6501 to 6538 (West 2006).
81. STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACr § 3 (1926).
82. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-6511.
83. Charles M1. Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154
(1955).
84. Id at 1156,n. 9.
85. Sections 1 and 2 of the SZEA provide authority to regulate the height and size of build-
ings, population density, location and use of buildings, and size of lots, among other related activities.
STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING Acr §§ 1, 2.
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sonable consideration, among other things, to the character of the dis-
trict and its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and with a view to
conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate
use of land through such municipality.86
Given that list of purposes supporting land-use regulation, and the obvious ne-
cessity of taking a broad view of a community in order to achieve each purpose,
it is unsurprising that the SZEA would include the reference to a comprehensive
plan. A note to section 3, titled "with a comprehensive plan," suggests that the
requirement that regulation be in accordance with such a plan "will prevent ha-
phazard or piecemeal zoning. No zoning should be done without such a compre-
hensive study." 87 While this requirement seems reasonable, the SZEA did not
defime "comprehensive plan" nor provide any guidance as to what the plan might
look like.
Two years later, after at least twenty-nine (of forty-eight) states had already
adopted the SZEA, the Department of Commerce completed the Standard City
Planning Enabling Act (SCPEA). The SCPEA refers to "municipal," "city," and
"master" plans, but does not use the term "comprehensive plan."88 As described
by the Planning Act, "[t]he plan shall be made with the general purpose of guid-
ing and accomplishing a coordinated, adjusted, and harmonious development of
the municipality and its environs which will, in accordance with present and
future needs, best promote health, safety, morals, order, convenience, prosperity,
and general welfare .. .."" The Planning Act anticipates that all land-use deci-
sions will be consistent with the provisions of any adopted "master plan," and
requires a two-thirds majority on the city council (or, presumably, other local
legislative bodies) to overrule a determination of the planning commission that a
specific project is inconsistent with the city's plan.9° A note to section 9 of the
SCPEA suggests that the section on the "legal status" of the city plan-ensuring
that the plan guides land-use decisions-is "one of the most important" compo-
nents of the SCPEA.91
Although the two standard acts use different language to describe the
"plan" at issue, the similar purposes and obvious physical connections between
planning and zoning might have led to the simple conclusion that the SZEA's
"comprehensive plan" is the same as the "municipal," "city," or "master" plan of
the SCPEA. Similarly, "in accordance with" might have led to the reasonable
conclusion that a comprehensive plan is legally enforceable on some level, at
least in the context of land-use decisions authorized by the SZEA. But from the
very beginning, courts struggled with how to implement the "in accordance
with" language.'
86. STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 3.
87. Id §3n.22.




92. See Haar, supra note 83.
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An early commentary on the "in accordance with" language suggests that,
in the first few decades after the SZEA, there was "a judicial tendency to interp-
ret the statutory directive that zoning ordinances shall be 'in accordance with a
comprehensive plan' as meaning nothing more than that zoning ordinances shall
be comprehensive."93 Over fifty years ago, Harvard law professor Charles Haar
argued in favor of comprehensive planning, already bemoaning its failure:
With different local agencies concentrating on streets, parks, roads, and
schools, and with the increasing tendency to delegate new techniques
such as urban renewal or public housing to ad hoc authorities, there is
danger that diverse legislative activities affecting the physical environ-
ment will not be coordinated, and that inefficiencies, inconsistencies,
and waste will result.'
In 1953, when Professor Haar made this argument, although almost 60% of ci-
ties over 10,000 residents had enacted zoning ordinances, only 32% had enacted
master plans.95
After fifty years ofjudicial decisions that failed to require a comprehensive
plan as a basis for land-use regulation, a few states have made that connection a
statutory requirement.' But that effect has been limited. An analysis in 2003
suggested that eighteen states continue to view the comprehensive plan as having
no independent legal significance, i.e., there does not need to be an independent
comprehensive plan. 97 Another twenty-six states give the comprehensive plan
some consideration in making land-use decisions, but the nature of that consid-
eration varies and is often limited.9" According to the 2003 analysis, only six
states fit into the "planning mandate" category, where plans are legally enforce-
able. But given that one state's Supreme Court appears to disagree with that ca-
tegorization,' and another's statutes require consistency with the plan for only a
93. Id at 1157.
94. Id. at 1155.
95. Id. at 1157 n.14.
96. See DANEL R MANDELKER, LAND UsE LAW § 3.01 (5th ed. 2003).
97. Edward J. Sullivan & Michael J. Michel, Ramapo Plus Thirty: The Changing Role of the
Plan in Land Use Regulation, 35 URB. LAW. 75, 86 (2003). This is referred to as the "Unitary Ap-
proach" because these states hold that comprehensive plans can be found in the zoning ordinance-it
need not be a separate document Id. at 84; see also Edward J. Sullivan & Laurence Kressel, Twenty
Years Afier-Renewed Significance of the Comprehensive Plan Requirement, 9 URB. L. ANN. 33 (1975);
Edward J. Sullivan, Recent Development in Land Use, Planning and Zoning Law: Comprehensive
Planning, 36 URB. LAW. 541 (2004); Edward J. Sullivan, Recent Developments in Comprehensive
Planning Law, 41 URB. LAW. 547 (2009) (characterizing the Unitary approach as "long the majority
position").
98. Edward J. Sullivan & Michael J. Michel, Ramapo Plus Thirty: The Changing Role of the
Plan in Land Use Regulation, 35 URB. LAW. 75, 86 (2003). Idaho falls into this category. Id. at 90. The
discussion below will demonstrate the limited nature of that consideration. See also Udell v. Haas, 235
N.E.2d 897, 902-03 (N.Y. 1968) (finding a "plan" in the village's pattern of zoning ordinances, even
though New York requires a comprehensive plan).
99. See Woods v. Kitias County, 174 P.3d 25, 33 (Wash. 2007) ("Comprehensive plans
serve as 'guide[s]' or 'blueprint[s]' to be used in making land use decisions. Thus, a proposed land use
decision must only generally conform, rather than strictly conform, to the comprehensive plan- A com-
prehensive plan does not directly regulate site-specific land use decisions." (citations omitted)).
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limited set of decisions,"° the reality on the ground is likely that plans have even
less effect than suggested.
These three arbitrary categories represent only some of the diversity that
exists across states in applying the original requirements that land-use decisions
be "in accordance with" a comprehensive plan. Given that different jurisdictions
have taken different approaches to the connection between comprehensive plans
and specific land-use decisions, we might assume that there is nothing in the "in
accordance with" language (or similar language) that forces a specific out-
come.' °' Put another way, assuming that the highest courts of the various states
are reasonable, we can conclude that multiple reasonable interpretations of the
"in accordance with" language exist. Because the language itself will not provide
a definitive conclusion as to the appropriate outcome-i.e., strict legal formalism
is not useful-we have to investigate the courts' other explanations for choosing
one outcome over another. The Idaho Supreme Court referred to his concept
most recently in 2008 when it determined that amendments to the Comprehen-
sive Plan do not "authorize any development" because a comprehensive plan "is
not a legally controlling zoning law. . ,,02 That clear and definitive statement
suggests that, at some point, the Court engaged in a careful analysis of the statu-
tory language and fully explained its decision. Given the importance of a plan in
guiding development and achieving a community's vision, we-the vision crea-
tors-should expect no less before our visions are legally dismissed.
In Giltner Dairy--the 2008 decision quoted above-the Court considered
the right to appeal a plan amendment; it did not consider the validity of a land-
use decision argued to be in conflict with the comprehensive plan. But the case
on which Giltner Dairy relied in stating that a comprehensive plan is not legally
enforceable, Evans v. Teton County, did specifically address this issue. In Evans
v. Teton County, the Idaho Supreme Court considered the largest single devel-
opment in Teton County's history.103 In 1999, when Teton County first consi-
100. Sullivan placed Wisconsin in the "planning mandate' category based on a statutory pro-
vision allowing denial of a subdivision plat if it is inconsistent with the comprehensive plan. See Sulli-
van & Michel, supra note 98, at 107 n.196; see also WIS. STAT. § 236.13(1)(c) (2008). This consistency
requirement does not appear to apply to any other provisions of Wisconsin land use law (e.g., zoning
designations).
101. It appears that the states placing the greatest significance on the comprehensive plan have
adopted their own language, e.g,, "shall be consistent with," see, e.g., CAL. GOVT. CODE §§ 65302.3(a),
65454 (West 2009) and FLA STAT. § 163.3194(l)(a) (2009), or decisions "shall be conditioned upon
compliance with" the plan, WIs. STAT. § 236.13(1)(c) (2008). Delaware has chosen the cleanest ap-
proach, providing that comprehensive plans "shall have the force of law." DEL. CODE. ANN. fit 22,
§ 702(d) (2010). I do not want to get lost in a discussion of whether "in accordance with" and "shall be
consistent with" require necessarily dissimilar legal interpretations. Nor do I care if they are the func-
tional equivalents. I think both phrases allow for multiple reasonable interpretations, no more. The more
important question is why a particular court would select a particular interpretation.
102. Giltner Dairy, LLC v. Jerome County, 145 Idaho 630, 632, 181 P.3d 1238, 1240 (2008),
(quoting Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 76, 73 P.3d 84, 89 (2003)), abrogated on other grounds
by Neighbors for Responsible Growth v. Kootenai County, 147 Idaho 173, 207 P.3d 149 (2009).
103. The Teton Springs Resort consists of, among other amenities, a golf course, equestrian
facilities, a heliport, a commercial district, and approximately 550 residential units and 150 overnight
accommodations on 780 acres. Prior to the development application, the land at issue was zoned R2.5,
which allowed one housing unit per 2.5 acres, or 312 total housing units on this specific site, without
any other commercial or other uses. See Jerrold A. Long, New West or Same West?: Evolving Land-
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dered the project, there were approximately 2,500 total housing units on 300
square miles of private land in the entire county."° The Teton Springs project-
with 550 new units-represented a 20 percent increase in the total number of
housing units available in the county.
But the absolute size of the development, and its inconsistency with the ex-
isting physical condition of the county,' °5 might not be relevant. In fact, for the
purposes of our discussion here, whether the project-and the zoning change
required to authorize the project-was actually consistent with the comprehen-
sive plan also is not relevant. Rather, our concern is whether the Idaho Supreme
Court considered whether that consistency (or lack thereof) might be relevant. In
addressing this point, the court wasted little time, Without any introduction or
analysis, the court stated:
A comprehensive plan is not a legally controlling zoning law, it serves
as a guide to local government agencies charged with making zoning
decisions .... The "in accordance with" language of I.C. § 67-6511
does not require zoning decisions to strictly conform to the land use de-
signations of the comprehensive plan. 106
Having recognized this point, the Court then noted that the comprehensive plan
is not without influence, but that the "in accordance with" determination is a
factual determination that can only be overturned where it is "clearly errone-
ous."1 7 The clearly erroneous standard provides an enormous amount of defe-
rence to local governments, and consequently, in the thirty-five years that the
Local Land-use Planning Act"' and the "in accordance with" language have
been part of Idaho land-use law, the Idaho Supreme Court has never overturned
a zoning ordinance or development decision for violating this standard." Only
once, in 1983, did the Idaho Court use the "in accordance with" language to
Use Institutions in the Rural American West 183-87 (2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
of Wisconsin-Madison) (on file with University of Wisconsin-Madison Library). Two subsequent de-
velopments that would surpass Teton Springs in size have been approved by the County but have suf-
fered indefinite delays due to the changed real estate market caused by both an over-supply of residential
lots in the county and the ongoing recession.
104. 2000 U.S. Census data, Summary File 1, Table HI, H18, Teton County, Idaho, available
at hrtp://www.census.gov/Press-Release/ww/2001/sunfilel .html. Approximately 2,000 of these hous-
ing units were "occupied" The other 500 were vacation homes.
105. Teton Springs is immediately adjacent to the town of Victor, Idaho. The 2000 census re-
ports that Victor had 840 residents in 330 housing units. In other words, Teton Springs would almost
triple the size of Victor. 2000 U.S. Census data, Summary File 1, Table HI, P1, Victor, Idaho, available
at http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2001/sunfilel.html.
106. Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 76, 73 P.3d 84, 89 (2003).
107. Id.
108. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 67-6501 to 6538 (West 2010).
109. The closest the Court has come to overturning a local decision based on this standard was
in Taylor v. Board of County Commissioners, where the Court noted: "Where the Board's findings do
not establish that the zone change applications are completely in accordance with the comprehensive
plan, it is difficult for a reviewing court to affirm the Board's decision that the zone change applications
are 'in accordance with' the comprehensive plan." 124 Idaho 392,400, 860 P.2d 8, 16 (1993). However,
perhaps suggesting a reticence to follow through on that threat, the Court ultimately avoided the issue
and overturned the county's decision on procedural grounds. Id. at 19.
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overturn a land-use decision."' In that case, the County failed to make any find-
ings of fact supporting the decision."'
Fully understanding any legal rule requires an investigation into why the
rule exists. As noted above, Idaho's land-use laws adopt principles that have
been in use across the country for decades. Although many states share Idaho's
approach, an increasing number do not." 2 Again, given the apparent ambiguity
in both the language of the statutory provision (and its origin), and the different
interpretations used by various competent courts, we can only conclude that the
language does not require a specific interpretation. Why then has Idaho chosen
the approach described in the Evans decision?
Although the Idaho Supreme Court had considered the interaction of the
comprehensive plan and subsequent land-use decisions briefly on at least one
previous occasion," 3 it did not thoroughly analyze the legal status of the com-
prehensive plan until Bone v. City of Lewiston in 1984.114 The Bone decision
appears to be the origin of the statement in Evans that comprehensive plans are
not legally enforceable. In its discussion of the status of comprehensive plans in
Evans, the Idaho Supreme Court cited to five different cases, including Bone. 5
Each of the other four cases relied on Bone, and none of them engaged in an in-
dependent analysis of the issue.' 6 Two of the cases included the identical state-
ment, both ultimately borrowing from Bone: "This Court has held that a compre-
hensive plan does not operate as legally controlling zoning law, but rather serves
to guide and advise the governmental agencies responsible for making zoning
decisions.' ' 17 Since all subsequent courts have followed suit, and dutifully cited
to Bone for the proposition that land-use decisions need not be in strict confor-
mance with the comprehensive plan-including to overturn a county ordinance
that would have independently required consistency with a comprehensive
plan"-we must consider the legitimacy of that initial decision.
110. Love v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Bingham County, 150 Idaho 558, 560, 671 P.2d 471,
473 (1983).
111. Id. at 560, 671 P.2d at 473. ("The district court's decision reversing the decision of the
Commission was appropriate because of the Commission's failure to make written findings in support of
its conclusions.").
112. See, e.g., Edward J. Sullivan. Recent Developments in Comprehensive Planning Law, 41
UR. LAW. 547 (2009); see also MANDELKER, supra note 69, at §3.01.
113. Love, 671 P.2d471.
114. Bone v. City of Lewiston, 107 Idaho 844, 693 P.2d 1046 (1984).
115. Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 73 P.3d 84, 89 (2003).
116. Friends of Farm to Market v. Valley County, 137 Idaho 192, 46 P.3d 9 (2002); Urrutia v.
Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 2 P.3d 738 (2000); Sprenger, Grubb, & Assoc. v. City of Hailey, 127
Idaho 576, 903 P.2d 741 (1995); Ferguson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Ada County, 110 Idaho 785,
718 P.2d 1223 (1986).
117. Urrutia, 134 Idaho at 357-58, 2 P.3d at 742-43; Friends of Farm to Market, 137 Idaho at
200, 46 P.3d at 17 (quoting Urrutia, 134 Idaho at 357-58, 2 P.2d at 742-43). The Urrutia decision cited
to a previous decision to support this statement; that previous decision relied on (and quoted) Bone. See
S. Fork Coalition v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Bonneville County, 117 Idaho 857, 792 P.2d 882, 888 (1990).
118. See Urrutia, 134 Idaho 353, 2 P.3d 738. The court determined that the county's require-
ment that subdivision proposals "shall conform to the Comprehensive Plan" was inappropriate in that it
"elevates the plan to the level of legally controlling zoning law." Id. at 743. I will discuss this argument
below in my discussion of the Bone decision, but it is worth noting here that requirement of confor-
mance with the plan was contained in a Blaine County ordinance. In other words, the County created a
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John Bone owned a parcel of land zoned for low-density residential use.
The City of Lewiston's land-use map, created as part of the City's comprehen-
sive plan, showed Mr. Bone's land as zoned for commercial use. Based on the
land-use map, Mr. Bone requested a rezone from residential to limited commer-
cial use. Because it determined that (a) commercial use would be incompatible
with the then existing residential uses of the surrounding properties, and (b) that
the city had an over abundance of unused commercial properties, Lewiston de-
nied Mr. Bone's request. Mr. Bone sought a writ of mandamus ordering the city
to rezone his land, based on the land-use classification of the land-use map, and
the requirement that zoning decisions be "in accordance with" the comprehen-
sive plan. The district dourt agreed with Mr. Bone and issued the writ.119
Before proceeding to consider the court's analysis, we should note, as the
court did, 2 ° that Mr. Bone based his claim on the land-use classification pro-
vided on the land-use map. The land-use map is but one component of the
broader comprehensive plan. At the time, comprehensive plans contained eleven
elements, one of which was "land use."' In addition to a discussion of natural
land types, identification of existing uses, and a discussion of the suitability of
lands for a variety of uses, the law required a map "indicating suitable projected
land uses for the jurisdiction." '22 Although the court recognized that the land-use
map "is not the comprehensive plan,"' and could have used that fact to reach a
narrow, case-specific decision, it relegated the point to a footnote and proceeded
with a much broader analysis.
On the surface, it might appear that the court's approach to the legal status
of comprehensive plans followed both formalistic and pragmatic trajectories.
The court identified two reasons for disagreeing with Mr. Bone's contention that
"he is entitled to have his property zoned in conformance with the City's land
use map."'24 The first is an apparently formalistic analysis of the statutory lan-
guage. The second, while superficially focusing on the purpose of the various
components, and thus suggesting the court might also be focusing on whether its
decision will promote those purposes, is also narrowly formalistic.
I suggest that the court followed purely formalistic approaches to resolving
this dispute not to denigrate that particular tool. As discussed above, there are
legitimate reasons to adopt formalism as a means to reaching justifiable legal
conclusions. But one inherent problem with a formalist approach is that it argues
law requiring consideration of a specific factor. The Idaho Court is suggesting that it is inappropriate to
allow a law to have the force of law.
119. All facts are taken from Bone, 107 Idaho at 845-47, 693 P.2d at 1047-49.
120. See id. at 849, 693 P.2d at 1051 n.7.
121. See 1975 Idaho Sess. Laws 516. Current law requires comprehensive plans consider fif-
teen components. Land use remains one of the required components. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-6508(a) to
(o) (2010).
122. See Bone, 107 Idaho at 849, 693 P.2d at 1051 n7. The current version of the law contains
the same language. IDAHO CODE ANN. §67-6508(e) (West 2010).
123. Bone, 107 Idaho at 849,693 P.2d at 1051 n.7.
124. Id. at 849, 693 P.2d at 1051 (emphasis added). Again, the Idaho Court recognized that
Mr. Bone was relying exclusively on the land use map, not the complete comprehensive plan.
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that the ultimate outcome is the only legitimate outcome, because that is the out-
come that the law requires. Absent the argument that the court's chosen outcome
is the only legitimate outcome, there would be no justification for formalism as
the ultimate arbiter, because there would be no mechanism for selecting between
two (or more) potential and equally legitimate outcomes.
The Bone court based its holding on two arguments: first, that Mr. Bone's
argument would make Idaho Code § 67-6511 internally inconsistent125, and
second, that his argument did not recognize the different purposes of a zoning
ordinance, the land-use map, and the comprehensive plan.'26 The court grounded
its first argument in Idaho Code § 67-6511(b), which provided, at that time,127
that if a rezoning request is in accordance with the comprehensive plan, the zon-
ing commission "may recommend and the governing board may adopt or reject
the [zoning] amendment [request]."' 25 The court spent very little time on this
argument, noting only that the legislature would have used "shall" had it desired
strict conformance with the comprehensive plan.129
The court's second argument characterizes Mr. Bone's argument as elevat-
ing the comprehensive plan to the status of a zoning ordinance, which, the court
suggests, "finds no basis in law or reason ... ."30 According to the court, the
zoning ordinance, land-use map, and comprehensive plan all serve different pur-
poses.' The court never identifies the purpose of the comprehensive plan, but
does point out that a land-use map is intended to designate suitable projected
land uses, while the zoning ordinance identifies permissible present uses.132 Ac-
cording to the court, the land-use map is a "goal or forecast" of future develop-
ment, and that it is "illogical to say that what has been projected as a pattern of
projected land use is what a property owner is entitled to have zoned today.' 33
Consequently, the land-use map cannot require that present zoning match what it
explicitly identifies as projected uses.3 3 The court then further justifies its logic
by identifying support in a "large body of case law," represented by cases from
three states.
35
Before we consider whether the court's reasoning is convincing, we should
recognize the court's scarcely concealed efforts to convince us that no other re-
sult is possible. For example, as noted, the court argues that the alternative result
125. Id.
126. Id. at 849-50, 693 P.2d at 1051-52.
127. As will be discussed below, the Idaho legislature has amended the statute to remove the
provision stafing that the proposed rezone should be in accordance with the comprehensive plan. Now
the requirement is simply that the local governing body must consider the comprehensive plan. This
change eliminates the justification for one of the Court's arguments in Bone. See 1999 Idaho Seas. Laws
1106.
128. Bone, 107 Idaho at 849, 693 P.2d at 1051 (emphasis provided by court); see 1975 Idaho
Sess. Laws 516.
129. Bone, 107 Idaho at 849, 693 P.2d at 1051.
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"finds no basis in law or reason."'13 6 The second part-that the argument has no
basis in reason-may ultimately be true, even if it seems too strong, but we
should first consider it a bit more carefully before reaching that conclusion. But
the first part-that the alternative finds no basis in law-is precisely the question
that the court is tasked with answering. We cannot know if the argument has a
basis in law until the court determines what the law is. The Bone court is basing
its determination of what the law should be on an understanding of what the law
already is. But this is the case that determines what the law is. It is one thing for
a court to rely unquestioningly-as the court has done since Bone-on estab-
lished precedent in determining that a particular argument has "no basis in law";
it is quite another for a court with no legal history to make the same claim.
Stripped of its pretenses, this statement is an attempt to use the law's authorita-
rian character to convince an audience to accept a specific outcome when mul-
tiple legitimate outcomes were possible. It is not an explanation. It is certainly
not a legal analysis.
While Mr. Bone's specific argument ultimately, and appropriately, may
have found no basis in law or reason, the court's ultimate holding-which went
much farther than the actual controversy before the court-was not so obvious.
Again, Bone stands for the proposition that land-use decisions do not have to
strictly conform to the comprehensive plan, and that the plan is a mere guide.
Was that outcome necessary?
The court's first argument faces two potential problems. The first problem
calls into question the validity of the court's reasoning in 1984. The second sug-
gests the Bone decision is no longer good law. The court based its legal analysis
in the use of the word "may" to describe the local government's range of options
in considering a request for a rezone-if the request is in accordance with the
comprehensive plan, the governing board may approve or reject it. In holding
that the word "may" determines the outcome of this case, the court made two
apparent mistakes:'37 it took an unnecessarily narrow view of the comprehensive
plan, and because of that narrow view, it assumed the outcome of the case. The
court apparently failed to recognize that a comprehensive plan is an effort to plan
for the growth and change of a community. As a community grows, acceptable
land uses in a given location will change-agriculture might transition to resi-
dential or industrial, residential might transition to commercial, and commercial
might transition to residential. It is precisely the role of the comprehensive plan
to recognize and plan for those transitions. The plan thus might recognize two or
more legitimate uses of a specific parcel of land over time. Both (or all) of those
uses would be in accordance with the comprehensive plan. Mr. Bone's land ade-
quately demonstrates this point. The plan recognized that at some point in the
following two decades it would transition from residential to commercial. The
136. Id.
137. I say "apparent mistakes" because the Court provided almost no explanation for this part
of its decision. We have no way of knowing what assumptions it did or did not make, but the assump-
tions I make about the Court's assumptions seem reasonable.
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precise moment of that transition might not be clear, and the plan must anticipate
both uses.
If we recognize this point-which is inherent in the concept of a "plan"-it
becomes clear that the use of the word "may" in this statutory provision would
be consistent with a legal requirement that all land-use decisions, including re-
zones, be done in strict accordance with the comprehensive plan. I suggested
above that the court assumed the outcome of the case. Use of the word "may" is
only inconsistent with a legally enforceable comprehensive plan if the existing
land uses are not in accordance with the existing comprehensive plan. That con-
dition could only occur if the comprehensive plan were not legally enforceable,
i.e., the existing zoning designations are inconsistent with the comprehensive
plan.138 But if both the existing use and the proposed use are consistent with a
comprehensive plan that anticipates the transition from the one use to the other,
it is entirely appropriate, and legally consistent, to grant to the local government
the discretion to determine when that transition should occur while still requiring
strict adherence to the comprehensive plan. Thus it is only by assuming that the
plan is not legally enforceable (i.e., does not influence existing conditions) that
the court can use the word "may" to determine that the plan is not legally enfor-
ceable. Had the Idaho court recognized the simple fact that a plan can (and often
must) anticipate multiple legitimate uses of a specific parcel over time, it might
not have found use of the word "may" to be inconsistent with a mandate of strict
conformance with the comprehensive plan.
Even assuming the court's original reasoning were valid (relying on
"may"), it is wholly irrelevant today. In 1999, the Idaho Legislature revised the
language at issue.'39 Now, instead of providing that a local governing board
"may" accept or reject a proposed amendment that is "in accordance with the
plan," the law provides that the board may accept or reject a proposed amend-
ment "[a]fter considering the comprehensive plan and other evidence ...."1"
This language implicitly recognizes that both the existing and proposed uses
might be consistent with the comprehensive plan, and appropriately grants the
local government the discretion to determine the appropriate approach at any
given time. To the extent Idaho courts continue to rely on Bone for precedent,
that reliance is now misplaced, at least with respect to this particular justification
for the Bone holding.
The Bone court's second argument is similarly problematic. In footnote 7,
the court recognizes that Mr. Bone's argument is based on the projected land
uses contained in the plan's land-use map, and the court repeatedly refers to this
fact. The land-use map is only one component of the comprehensive plan, and
can only be understood in connection with the rest of the plan. Despite recogniz-
ing that point, the court went on to base its second argument entirely on the dif-
ferent purposes of zoning ordinances and land-use maps. It did not discuss the
138. Again, an existing use might be inconsistent with what the plan anticipates for the future,
but this is not inconsistent with the plan itself The plan would anticipate those transitions.
139. 1999 Idaho Sess. Laws 1106.
140. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-6511(b) (West 2010); 1999 Idaho Sess. Laws 1106.
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purpose of the comprehensive plan itself, and whether that purpose suggests the
need to make the plan legally enforceable. But assuming the court actually did
consider the purpose of the comprehensive plan-which it did not-we see again
that the court assumed the outcome to justify its decision that a comprehensive
plan is not legally enforceable. In introducing its argument, the court suggests
Mr. Bone's position would elevate the plan to the status of a zoning ordinance.
The court's implicit suggestion is that only a zoning ordinance is legally enfor-
ceable, and since a comprehensive plan is not a zoning ordinance, it cannot be
legally enforceable. But that simply assumes that a comprehensive plan is not
legally enforceable, which again is precisely the question before the court. The
court's focus on the land use map avoids this question, and again ignores that the
plan necessarily includes present and future uses. The fact that the present is not
yet the future does not require that the plan for transitioning between the two not
be legally enforceable.
It is easy to criticize a decision that is now almost three decades old, but it
is not my intent to argue that Bone is necessarily incorrect. Rather, I only argue
that it is not necessarily correct. There is nothing about the "in accordance with"
language that requires a particular outcome, but three decades of Idaho courts
have relied unquestioningly on a decision with incomplete and questionable rea-
soning. More unfortunate, the court that determined that comprehensive plans
are not legally enforceable was not even presented with that question. The only
argument before it, as it recognized on several occasions, was whether the land-
use map should be legally enforceable. That is a separate question. For almost
three decades, Idaho courts have relied on dicta to justify a crucial distinction in
Idaho land-use law.
My position throughout this article has been that law is only justified when
it promotes the purpose of the community that ultimately created the law. The
Bone decision-or more accurately, the Idaho Supreme Courts' continued re-
liance on Bone-demonstrates an institutionalized tendency to elevate myth over
purpose. Failing to connect law to purpose has both philosophical, as well as
practical consequences; we lose the justification for law, and we lose the ability
to enact vision on the ground. A recent Idaho case demonstrates the potentially
significant consequences of an unnecessary elevation of myth over purpose, and
shows that the relationship between community visions and place-specific land-
use decisions is even more disconnected than the jettisoning of comprehensive
plans might suggest.
In 2009, the Idaho Supreme Court considered-or better said, did not con-
sider-a challenge to a local government decision denying a request for a re-
zone. '4 The parcel of land had been zoned "Transitional Agriculture Two,"
which allowed a variety of agricultural and residential uses. 142 The purpose of
this zone, as articulated in the current version of the county's zoning ordinance,
141. Burs Holding, LLC v. Madison County Bd of County Cornm'rs, 147 Idaho 660, 214
P.3d 646 (2009).
142. Id. at 661, 214 P.3d at 647.
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is to "provide for and protect residential lands of a single-family residential envi-
ronment.., by providing for an area of transition from agricultural uses to resi-
dential. ' 143 The landowner sought a comprehensive plan amendment, and a zon-
ing change to "commercial" and "light industrial," in order to construct a con-
crete batch plant that would be surrounded by a commercial zone buffer. Al-
though the planning and zoning commission recommended that county commis-
sioners approve the application, the county denied the request for a plan amend-
ment, and simply failed to act on the zone change request.1 45 The county ap-
proved a very similar request by another concrete company at about the same
time. 146
As a run-of-the-mill land-use controversy, this case might not have war-
ranted much attention. Granted, it does demonstrate hints of political favoritism.
And the change from agricultural/residential to light industrial, and ad hoc
changes to a duly-adopted comprehensive plan (which the planning and zoning
commission recommended in a 6-1 vote), 47 should cause concern for anyone
interested in creating sustainable communities or the predictability and equitable
treatment that are the foundation of the rule-of-law myth. But political favoritism
and ad hoc decision making are elements of any land-use controversy, and what-
ever their local significance, they are local issues. The Idaho Supreme Court
never considered those issues. The court never considered the county's justifica-
tion for denying the plan amendment, or lack thereof, and did not address the
county's complete failure to respond to the request for a small rezone. Even had
the court considered these issues, it is unlikely the result would have changed, as
local governments receive a substantial amount of deference in legislative de-
terminations of this nature. 4 ' But by not considering these issues, the Idaho
court took a simple, local land-use controversy and created a problem of state-
wide significance.
While it often seems counter-intuitive to the uninitiated, absent specific and
somewhat limited conditions, there is no inherent right to challenge decisions by
local governments.' 49 This fact should be somewhat more obvious in the zoning
143. MADISON COUNTY, IDAHO, ZONING ORDINANCE § 7.1 (April 8, 1997), available at
http://www.co.madison.idus/modules/smartsection/visit.phpfileid=8.
144. Burns, 147 Idaho at 661, 214 P.3d at 647.
145. Id. at 662, 214 P.3d at 648.
146. Id. The other company requested a plan amendment and zone change in order to operate
a gravel pit surrounded by a commercial zone buffer. That company, Walters Ready Mix, Inc., has been
in business in the area for several decades.
147. Id. at 661,214 P.3d at 647.
148. In reviewing the actions of local governments, courts often distinguish between legisla-
tive and quasi-judicial determinations, with this distinction often being outcome detenminative. Deci-
sions characterized as "legislative" receive near complete deference from reviewing courts. See, e.g.,
JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT
REGULATION LAW 226 (Thomson West 2003) (1998). See also Highlands Dev. Corp. v. City of Boise,
145 Idaho 958, 965, 188 P.3d 900, 907 (2008) ("Not every zoning decision, however, is subject to judi-
cial review. This Court has historically drawn a line between decisions that are legislative in nature and
those that are quasi-judicial in nature, only allowing review of the latter category.").
149. Certain limitations on government authority are considered self-executing and do not re-
quire separate legislative authorization to provide for a right to challenge government action. In the land-
use context, the best example is the Fifth Amendment's takings clause, which prohibits the taking of
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context, where the authority to zone-and the limitations on the exercise of that
authority-originate in state law. Without specific action by the state, no restric-
tions or limitations on pre-existing land-use authority would exist, and thus the
only available appeal rights would be found in broader Constitutional protec-
tions. 50 Recognizing this fact, the Idaho Constitution provides that the "legisla-
ture shall provide a proper system of appeals . .2,,51
In the Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA), '52 the Idaho Legislature
provided the right to appeal land-use decisions by local governments. There are
two relevant provisions. The first, titled "Permit granting process" provides: "An
applicant denied a permit or aggrieved by a decision may within twenty-eight
(28) days after all remedies have been exhausted under local ordinance seek
judicial review . . . ."' The second, titled "Actions by affected persons," uses
slightly more limited language: "An affected person aggrieved by a decision may
within twenty-eight (28) days after all remedies have been exhausted under local
ordinances seek judicial review ... ,' In both instances, an "affected person"
is a person "having an interest in real property which may be adversely affected
by the issuance or denial of a permit authorizing the development." ''
Since both provisions authorizing judicial review of local land-use deci-
sions only grant that right to persons adversely affected by the grant or denial of
a "permit," the Court had little trouble determining that it lacked jurisdiction to
hear this particular appeal:
[T]here was no right of judicial review of the Board's action with re-
spect to the rezone application because, as with the application for an
amendment to the comprehensive plan, there is no statute authorizing
judicial review of a county's action regarding a rezone application. An
application for a zoning change, like a request for an amendment to a
comprehensive plan, is not an application for a "permit," and thus no
review is authorized under the LLUPA. There is no specific grant of au-
thority to review the Board's action with respect to the request for re-
zone, and we may not assume the role of the legislature and grant that
authority to ourselves. 56
private property for public use without just compensation. See First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 314 (1987).
150. In this way, Idaho differs from most other states on one significant point: the inherent au-
thority of counties and municipalities to regulate land, The Idaho Constitution grants police power au-
thority directly to counties and municipalities. IDAHO CONST. art. XII, § 2. With the qualified exception
of certain "home rule" communities, counties and municipalities only exist as creatures of the state
government, and only possess that authority granted by state governments. See, e.g., Hunter v. City of
Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907). Consequently, while use of the phrase "pre-existing land-use
authority" is appropriate in Idaho, it would not be appropriate in most other circumstances.
151. IDAHO CONST. art. V, § 13 (emphasis added).
152. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-6501 to 38 (West 2010).
153. Id. § 67-6519(4).
154. Id. § 67-6521(1)(d).
155. Id. § 67-6521(1)(a).
156. Bums Holdings, LLC v. Madison County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 147 Idaho 660, 663,
214 P.3d 646, 649 (2009).
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This is not a problem that had troubled the court in the past. On numerous occa-
sions since the legislature created the LLUPA in 1975, the court had upheld the
right of affected persons to challenge decisions to grant or deny re-zoning appli-
cations. The Idaho Legislature has never reacted to the court's interpretation of
its law, suggesting it was not terribly concerned that the court had authorized
review of zoning activities. 57 Even as recently as 2004, in a unanimous decision,
the Idaho court exercised jurisdiction to hear a challenge to a re-zoning decision,
determining that Idaho Code section 67-6521(d) authorizes review of the denial
of a request for a re-zone. 58 That case addressed exclusively the county's denial
of a request to re-zone a property in order to allow for a specific development. "9
Chief Justice Eismann authored the 2004 decision allowing judicial review of a
re-zoning decision; but the Chief Justice took the opposite position in 2009, join-
ing a 3-2 decision that effectively overturned twenty-five years of case law."e
I do not include this brief commentary on the Burns decision to suggest
that the Idaho Supreme Court made a legal mistake in holding as it did. To the
contrary, the decision appears to be "right," at least in a strictly formalistic sense.
But even if the decision is correct in that somewhat narrow sense, it is decidedly
un-pragmatic. New law students often struggle to understand the difference be-
tween the result that their life experiences, personal ethics, or common sense
suggest, and the result that the law suggests. This is an appropriate confusion,
and should be explored. But it is too often resolved by inculcating a "the rule (or
language) always wins" approach, common sense be damned.
Law students are not without some company in this confusion. Judge Ri-
chard Posner has recognized two potentially overlapping ways in which a judi-
cial decision might be "right., 161 In the first, a decision is right if it follows
precedent or pre-existing formal norms of judicial interpretation, analysis, or
logic. 162 This type of decision promotes predictability and supports the authorita-
rian character of legal regimes. 16 The second type of "right" decision is one
which reaches a just or fair result in the specific case at hand."14 Legal formalism
certainly can lead to just results, but the cases that trouble new law students-
and should trouble judges-are those cases where the formalist approach seems
157. See, e.g., id. at 666, 214 P.3d at 652 (Jones, J., dissenting) ("It is presumed that the Legis-
lature had full knowledge of those judicial interpretations when it amended section 67-6519 in 1993,
2000 and 2003, and when it amended section 67-6521 in 1993 and 1996. Yet, in none of these instances
did the Legislature indicate any intent to overturn the long-standing and consistently-followed holdings
in Hill and Love. It must be presumed that the Legislature was content with such holdings.").
158. See In re Application for Zoning Change,140 Idaho 512, 513-14, 96 P.3d 613, 614-15
(2004) ("A person aggrieved by a planning and zoning decision may seek judicial review of that deci-
sion nder the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act.")
159. Id. at 513, 96 P.3d at 614.
160. Burns Holdings, LLC, 147 Idaho 660,214 P.3d 646 (2009).
161. See generally Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, in THE REVIVAL OF
PRAGMATISM: NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, LAw, AND CULTURE 235-53 (Morris Dickstein ed.,
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unjust, where judges elevate the sanctity of the rule of law over the people, plac-
es, and communities that law was created to serve.
We can extend that reasoning to add a third category of right decisions, a
category that can overlap with one or both of the previous categories: a judicial
decision can also be right if it serves to promote or sustain a set of conditions or
relationships that is consistent with the community's collective vision of its fu-
ture. Put another way, a judicial decision is right if its helps us create the type of
world we want to live in. I would argue that while it satisfies the definition of
right in the first category, and potentially the second (the effective affirmation of
the denial of the re-zone might have been the most fair or just result in that spe-
cific circumstance), the Burns decision fails the third category. It does not pro-
mote the visions of community that justify legal regimes.'65
While my critiques of the Idaho Supreme Court, both current and past,
might be somewhat overzealous, they are not unjustified. In that, I do not mean
that my approach or legal analysis is better."6 In fact, my critique is not meant to
focus on the analysis at all. Rather, the critique is justified because those deci-
sions lead to on-the-ground outcomes that are inconsistent with our understand-
ings of the purposes the law serves-that is to say, my focus is on the conse-
quence. Both Burns and Bone lead to outcomes that are inconsistent with the
community's vision, as the community has chosen to articulate that vision, in
that they do not allow the law to consider that vision. In the Burns case, the re-
medy lies appropriately in the Idaho Legislature, which can, and should, address
the problem with relative ease. And while the Bone misstep could also be reme-
died by the legislature, that approach is unnecessary.'6 7 The Idaho Supreme
Court is unafraid to overturn decades of precedent, even where the on-the-
ground effects could be extremely troubling, 6 ' where it considers that approach
necessary to faithfully follow the guidance of the people's representatives.
Should the court not be similarly willing to overturn decades of even more ques-
tionable precedent in order to implement the visions of our Idaho communities?
Why are the desires of the legislature more crucial than the desires of the people,
165. Formalism can be a pragmatic choice where predictability and adherence to legislative
determinations are determined to be preferable to the alternatives. See id But in this case, as noted in the
dissent, the legislature had arguably acquiesced to the Court's twenty-five years of consistent holdings.
166. In this statement, I must admit I am being somewhat disingenuous. I would define "bet-
ter" as that approach or analysis that would yield the outcome that the community would prefer over
other alternative outcomes. Given that this artide is based on the argument that allowing implementation
of the community's vision in legal regimes will yield outcomes that more closely match the communi-
ty's visions, which are what ultimately justify law, it is obvious that I do think my approach is "better."
167. And given the court's reasoning in Urruia, it might not solve the problem.
168. "For example, a developer wishing to pursue plans for construction of a nuclear power
plant may determine that, with a favorably-inclined county commission, it is better to seek a zoning
change that would permit such project, rather than a conditional use permit that would provide the same
result If the county commission granted the zoning change, affected citizens would have no right of
judicial review. If the developer pursued the conditional use permit avenue, the affected citizens would
have the right of judicial review." Bums Holdings, LLC v. Madison County Bd of County Comm'rs,
147 Idaho 660, 667, 214 P.3d 646, 653 (2009) (Jones, J., dissenting).
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particularly where the legislature has demonstrated little concern if the court
takes another approach?
Nothing in our myth requires this disconnect. To the contrary, a true "rule
of law" would not elevate questionable, unjustified precedent over the desires of
the community. The failure to enforce the plans, and the community visions
those plans represent, that provide the foundation for legal regimes undercuts the
authority of those legal regimes and removes any social justification for the re-
gime. Without the vision, there is no reason for the law; it lacks purpose, and
thus should not be enforced.
V. SUSTAINABILITY PLANNING: CONNECTING PURPOSE TO
CONSEQUENCE, AND UNDERSTANDING THE IMPORTANCE OF
CHOICE IN JUSTIFYING LEGAL REGIMES
The solution to achieving visions of sustainable communities lies not in jet-
tisoning entirely the existing legal regimes that regulate those communities, even
if there are specific laws or ordinances that might stand in the way of achieving
the community vision. Problem-specific ordinances are a necessary component
of any institutional structure, even ordinances that regulate the minutiae of our
lives, like the location and number of power outlets in our homes. Existing re-
gimes are problematic not because they contain narrow, issue-specific approach-
es, but because they contain only narrow, issue-specific approaches. There is no
legally enforceable mechanism to tie all of those narrow approaches together
into the much broader, and more nuanced and intricate, tapestry that is the com-
munity. Creating enforceable sustainability plans allows implementation of sus-
tainability principles-and thus the visions of the community-in issue-specific
legal regimes that must be consistent with, and implement, the sustainability
plans.
Our problem is not that we do not know how to understand our prefe-
rences, articulate visions of a community, or create a physical picture and de-
scription of our visions. Almost every community in the country engages in ex-
actly this exercise on a somewhat regular basis. Our problem is that we have yet
to connect visions of community to enforceable legal regimes, even though we
already have a mechanism for making that connection. Our current comprehen-
sive planning approach will require some adjustment to ensure it can direct us on
a path toward sustainability, but it provides a place to start.
Idaho's comprehensive planning laws-and the comprehensive planning
regimes of most other states-already provide the tools for creating useful sus-
tainability plans. Idaho law requires that comprehensive plans consider fifteen
different areas, including land use, natural resources, transportation, economic
development, among other issues related to sustainability.169 Under the current
169. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-6508(d)-(e), (i), (f) (West 2010). The required components are
property rights, population, school facilities and transportation, economic development, land use, natural
resources, hazardous areas, public services, facility and utilities, transportation, recreation, special areas
or sites, housing, community design, implementation, and national interest electric transmission corri-
dors. Id. § 67-6508(a) to (o).
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regime, there is no specific requirement that the plan consider sustainability per
se, but the law does provide that "the plan shall consider previous and existing
conditions, trends, desirable goals and objectives, or desirable future situations
for each planning component." 170 As currently written, therefore, Idaho's com-
prehensive planning statute allows Idaho communities to identify their own
community visions. The only thing standing in the way of making that vision
legally enforceable is Bone and its progeny (including Burns). Idaho could de-
cide today to allow enforceable sustainability plans.
A complaint about this approach might be that it is unnecessarily restrictive
and would not allow a community to respond to changing conditions over time.
But plans can evolve. And consider the alternative. The failure to enforce com-
prehensive plans allows land-use decisions that are inconsistent with the com-
munity's stated preferences. This approach allows land-use decisions to vary
with the whims of the local government; creating new benefits for advantageous-
ly-situated private individuals becomes more important than protecting the inter-
ests of the community. Quixotically, the Idaho Supreme Court has argued that
enforceable comprehensive plans would provide local governments "unbounded
discretion" in making land-use decisions, which would be inconsistent with ad-
herence to the rule of law.' To borrow from the Idaho court, this argument has
no basis in law or reason. It is the failure to enforce comprehensive plans that
provides unbounded discretion to local governments. Enforceable comprehen-
sive plans promote predictability and provide specific guidelines for how gov-
ernments should proceed. Under current law, local governments can change zon-
ing districts without being subject to judicial review. And local governments can
authorize virtually any land development under the guise that it is "in accordance
... with the comprehensive plan,"' 72 without any Idaho court carefully consider-
ing the legitimacy of that determination. That is the definition of unbounded
discretion. Enforcing comprehensive plans is a better alternative.
We have two options. One is pragmatic, and thus inherently democratic.
The other is autocratic.' We can make the simple decision to allow the law to
evolve in a manner that is consistent with our visions of community, and thus
implement those visions of community. Or we can continue to follow a myth as
it travels outside of its realm of usefulness. If we desire to build sustainable
communities-and communities worthy of sustaining-we must create a path
connecting our visions of community and purpose to the rule of law.
170. Id. § 67-6508.
171. Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 359-60, 2 P.3d 738, 744-45 (2000).
172. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-6511 (West 2010).
173. See HILARY PurNAM, RENEWING PHILOSOPHY 188-89 (Harvard University Press 1992)
(quoting John Dewey "A class of experts is inevitably so removed from common interests as to become
a class with private interests and private knowledge, which in social matters is no knowledge at all.")
